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Age at marriage has for decades been the strongest and most unequivocal 
predictor of marital failure.  The likelihood of divorce nears eighty percent for 
those who marry in mid-adolescence, then drops steadily.  Delaying marriage 
until the mid-twenties reduces one’s likelihood of divorce to thirty percent.  
Women who marry at age twenty-one or younger, moreover – and one in ten 
U.S. women do – experience worse mental and physical health, attain less 
education, and earn lower wages than those who marry later.  Post-divorce, 
they and their children tend to endure even greater economic deprivation and 
instability than do never-married mothers, who will frequently have invested 
more in market work and education. 
While the social cost of early marriage is significant, U.S. policy disregards 
the hundreds of thousands of young people currently married or divorced, as 
well as those who may be contemplating early marriage.  A comprehensive 
analysis of early marriage and its regulation is overdue, and this Article 
undertakes that task. 
The Article argues that a historic confluence of cultural and structural 
changes has simultaneously transformed the social function and meaning of 
modern marriage and prolonged the course of development to adulthood.  It 
advances a new conception of “marital capacity” to supplant the current legal 
concept of consent, which is inadequate in the context of marriage.  This new 
conception recognizes adolescents’ and emerging adults’ cognitive abilities to 
understand and voluntarily consent to marriage, but also accounts for their 
psychosocial immaturity and incomplete acquisition of other abilities required 
to sustain modern marriage. 
The median age at first marriage is rising, reflecting gradual social 
adaptation to these cultural and structural changes.  Legal adaptation, 
however, has lagged.  Even though law is only one of the structural influences 
on family formation, legal change bringing the marital age in line with the 
modern social institution will go far to alleviate the strain on individuals and 
cost to society imposed by early marriage. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the U.S. Senate unanimously voted to enact the International 
Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act of 2010.1  The bill aimed 
 
1 International Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act of 2010, S. 987, 111th 
Cong. (2010); 156 CONG. REC. S8353-55 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2010).  The bill never became 
law, failing to pass in the House of Representatives.  156 CONG. REC. H8551-52 (daily ed. 
Dec. 16, 2010).  The House version of the bill had the initial support of 112 co-sponsors, but 
opposition arose following last-minute circulation of a memo that erroneously claimed its 
passage would authorize U.S.-funded abortions abroad.  International Protecting Girls by 
Preventing Child Marriage Act of 2009, H.R. 2103, 111th Cong. (2009) (listing bill sponsor 
and original co-sponsors); Conor Williams, Child Marriage Bill UPDATE, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 17, 2010, 11:50 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/12/child_m 
arriage_bill_update.html.  House members introduced another version of the bill, which was 
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“[t]o protect girls in developing countries through the prevention of child 
marriage,”2 and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton joined its drafters 
in denouncing “‘all cases of child marriage as child abuse.’”3  The bill’s 
explicit target was marriage by individuals below a country’s legal minimum 
age, but its factual findings all alluded to marriage by girls under eighteen.4 
The irony apparently lost on U.S. lawmakers who supported the bill is that 
child marriage is not limited to developing countries but is also a domestic 
practice; more than one in ten of all U.S. women surveyed between 2001 and 
2002 had married before age eighteen, with an estimated 9.4 million having 
married at age sixteen or younger.5 In 2010, more than 500,000 U.S. teens 
were married, divorced, separated, or widowed.6 
What is surely the most familiar statistic of modern American family life – 
that nearly half of all marriages end in divorce7 – obscures significant and 
consistent variations in marital stability depending on the age at which people 
first marry.  For decades now, age at marriage has been the most consistent and 
 
referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.  International Prevention of Child 
Marriage Act of 2010, H.R. 6521, 111th Cong. (2010).  As of this writing, no further action 
on the reintroduced bill has been reported. 
2 S. 987. 
3 Id. § 2 (emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO. 111-344, at 2 (2010). 
4 S. 987 §§ 2-3.  The bill declared countries with high rates of marriages by those under 
eighteen to be “high-prevalence areas for child marriage” and required the State Department 
to provide status reports on the practice of child marriage, presumptively defining “child 
marriage” for reporting purposes to mean marriage by individuals under the age of eighteen 
if no legal minimum is stipulated by law.  Id. § 2. 
5 Yann Le Strat, Caroline Dubertet & Bernard Le Foll, Child Marriage in the United 
States and Its Association with Mental Health in Women, 128 PEDIATRICS 524, 526 (2011) 
(drawing from a sample of over 24,000 American women and concluding that child 
marriage increases the risk of lifetime psychological disorders in women).  Le Strat and his 
colleagues analyzed data drawn from the 2001 to 2002 National Epidemiologic Survey on 
Alcohol and Related Conditions (a population-based, national, representative-sample 
survey) to evaluate the impact of child marriage on the mental health of women in the 
general adult population.  Using a sample of more than 24,575 women, the researchers 
found that women who married before age eighteen experienced higher rates of both 
lifetime and current psychiatric disorders than did women who married as adults. The study 
thus concluded that “[c]hild marriage increases the risk of lifetime and current psychiatric 
disorders in the United States.”  See id. at 524, 528. For a more detailed discussion of the 
study’s findings, see infra notes 217-219 and accompanying text. 
6 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS OF PEOPLE 15 
YEARS AND OVER, BY AGE, SEX, PERSONAL EARNINGS, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, at Table 
A1 (2010) [hereinafter MARITAL STATUS OF PEOPLE 15 YEARS AND OVER], available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2010.html. 
7
 ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE 
FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY 4 (2009) [hereinafter CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND]; 
National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm. 
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unequivocal predictor of marital failure.8  Of marriages entered at age twenty-
five or later, fewer than thirty percent end in divorce.9  Of marriages entered 
before age eighteen, on the other hand, nearly seventy percent end in divorce.10  
The earliest marriers, those adolescents who enter marriage in their mid-teens, 
experience marital failure rates closer to a sobering eighty percent.11  Not until 
age twenty-two does marital stability improve significantly and do marriage 
dissolution rates begin to level off, although marriages entered at later ages are 
more stable still. 12 
The costs of child marriages (those entered before age eighteen) as well as 
early marriages more generally (those entered at age twenty-one or younger) 
extend beyond the likelihood of their dissolution.  Early marriers are more 
likely than those who delay or avoid marriage to discontinue their formal 
educations prematurely, earn low wages, and live in poverty.13  Women who 
marry early develop more mental health problems and experience worse 
physical health than those who marry later.14  Following divorce, mothers (and 
their children) tend to suffer greater economic deprivation and instability than 
do their never-married counterparts.15 
This Article sets out to address early marriage – not only to draw attention 
to its costs, but also to explore the social factors that influence age at marriage, 
to gain a better understanding of the underlying causes of its historic failure 
 
8 THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2001: THE SOCIAL HEALTH 
OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 19 (2001); Tim B. Heaton, Factors Contributing to Increasing 
Marital Stability in the United States, 23 J. FAM. ISSUES 392, 407 (2002); Jeffry H. Larson & 
Thomas B. Holman, Premarital Predictors of Marital Quality and Stability, 43 FAM. REL. 
228, 230 (1994). 
9 Heaton, supra note 8, at 407 fig.2. 
10 Id.; see also NAOMI SEILER, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, IS TEEN MARRIAGE A 
SOLUTION? 7 fig.5 (2002). 
11 Heaton, supra note 8, at 407 fig.2. 
12 See infra Part II.B. 
13 Gordon B. Dahl, Early Teen Marriage and Future Poverty, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 689, 691 
(2010); see also Karl L. Alexander & Thomas W. Reilly, Estimating the Effects of Marriage 
Timing on Educational Attainment: Some Procedural Issues and Substantive Clarifications, 
87 AM. J. SOC. 143, 143-44 (1981); Thomas Ewin Smith & Eugenia Hooker, Sex Differences 
in Marriage and Parenthood as Factors Impeding Educational Attainment, 59 SOC. INQUIRY 
343, 343 (1989). 
14 Le Strat, Dubertet & Le Foll, supra note 5, at 527-28 (“[C]ontrolling for 
sociodemographic characteristics, child marriage was significantly associated with all 
lifetime mental disorders except pathological gambling and histrionic and dependent 
personality disorders.”). 
15 Daniel T. Lichter, Deborah Roempke Graefe & J. Brian Brown, Is Marriage a 
Panacea? Union Formation Among Economically Disadvantaged Unwed Mothers, 50 SOC. 
PROBS. 60, 75 (2003) (finding that for African American, Hispanic, and White women alike, 
“getting married and later divorcing more than doubles the likelihood of poverty”); see also 
SEILER, supra note 10, at 8. 
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rate, and through this better understanding, to propose legal reform informed 
by more than the simple empirical evidence of its failure. 
The Article analyzes the legal and social history of marital age and its 
regulation, as well as research from social anthropology and the social and 
developmental sciences.  It argues that a historic confluence of developments 
in cultural and structural factors that influence marriage has simultaneously 
transformed the social functions and meaning of modern marriage (increasing 
the relational capacities required to sustain it) and prolonged the course of 
development to adulthood (rendering adolescents and emerging adults – whose 
cognitive and psychological development we now know continues into the 
early twenties – even less likely to possess those requisite capacities). 
To redress the inadequacy of our current legal framework, which conflates 
capacity to consent with capacity to perform, this Article advances a new 
conception of “marital capacity.”  To give legally valid consent, a person must 
possess the cognitive abilities to understand the basic nature of the marital 
obligation and to voluntarily agree to marry.  To sustain the modern marriage, 
a person must possess core aspects of psychosocial maturity and other abilities.  
The Article discusses research in the developmental sciences demonstrating 
that young people have attained the former cognitive abilities by mid-
adolescence (ages fifteen or sixteen), but that they will not attain the latter 
psychosocial maturity and other abilities until late adolescence/emerging 
adulthood (the early twenties).  It argues that “marital capacity” requires the 
attainment of both. 
The median age at first marriage is rising, reflecting gradual social 
adaptation to these cultural and structural changes.  Legal adaptation, however, 
has lagged.  Law is only one of the structural influences on family formation.  
A legal structure that better corresponds to the nature and requirements of the 
modern social institution can, however, go far to alleviate the strain on 
individuals and cost to society imposed by early marriage.  Law and legal 
institutions create and support civil marriage, using it as a tool to achieve 
socially desirable ends.16  State-supported privileges and other benefits linked 
to marriage, while difficult to quantify, are vast.  Economic benefits alone total 
billions of dollars annually in direct federal and state payments, tax benefits, 
and workplace-based benefits.17  It is debatable whether marriage in general 
produces outcomes that justify the massive public investment in the institution.  
 
16 June Carbone, Morality, Public Policy and the Family: The Role of Marriage and the 
Public/Private Divide, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267, 269-70 (1996); Vivian Hamilton, 
Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 308-09 (2004). 
17 Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 141, 
166-69 (2003).  Bernstein notes that “[t]he United States government subsidizes marriage 
through transfer payments and other supports that are not means tested.  These payments 
constitute a reward that taxpayers as a group bestow on a class of individuals based solely 
on these persons’ being . . . married.”  Id. at 167-68.  Social Security transfer payments and 
Medicare benefits are just two examples of subsidies that reward marriage.  Id. at 167, 169. 
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That early marriage does not is apparent.  This Article thus urges 
reconsideration of state policies that give early marriages legal effect. 
Part I provides historical, legal, and social context.  It begins with the legal 
history of marital age regulation, which underscores the once-essential 
functions of marriage in society.  It describes the current legal landscape, 
which has not strayed far from its common law roots.  It then examines the 
significant and interrelated influence on marriage, and age at marriage, of 
changing economic and cultural conditions.  It turns to social anthropology for 
an integrative account of the evolution of the social functions of marriage and 
the meaning of marriage itself.  These social changes have rendered marriage 
less essential to individuals’ economic survival and social acceptance, 
eliminated once-clearly defined spousal roles, making it necessary for 
individual couples to negotiate them, and increased individuals’ expectations 
of the marital relationship itself. 
Part II examines the demographics of modern early marriage and the largely 
overlooked yet overwhelming empirical data that reveals its social costs.  Laws 
universally require parents to consent to the marriages of children younger than 
eighteen.18  Parental consent, however, safeguards child marriages against 
negative outcomes insufficiently, if at all.  The same can be said for delaying 
marriage until eighteen, the near-universal age of legal majority.  
Improvements in marital stability and outcomes appear only when couples 
delay marrying until their early twenties. 
Part III argues that the law has failed to keep pace with these significant 
social developments.  This Article argues that the social changes chronicled in 
the previous Parts demonstrate that the psychosocial capacities required to 
sustain a modern marriage have changed drastically over the last fifty years, 
while the cognitive capacity to understand and voluntarily consent to marry 
have remained essentially unchanged for centuries.  It argues that the social 
and legal factors that once justified early marriage either no longer exist, or are 
sufficiently weak as to be outweighed by the state’s obligation to safeguard the 
general welfare by – at a minimum – abandoning unreasonable policies 
demonstrably in derogation of it.  The Article briefly describes relevant aspects 
of adolescent cognitive and psychological development, which continues well 
into late adolescence and beyond, and the age-related attainment of marital 
capacity.19 
The Article concludes that states should return the presumptive age of 
consent to twenty-one, permit younger individuals to marry with judicial – not 
parental – consent, and withhold altogether legal recognition from marriages of 
adolescents younger than eighteen. 
 
18 See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra Parts II.B.1-2.  See generally JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, EMERGING 
ADULTHOOD: THE WINDING ROAD FROM THE LATE TEENS THROUGH THE TWENTIES (2004). 
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I. AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE IN CONTEXT 
This Part explores the influence of social contexts on age at first marriage.  
Scholars broadly characterize these contextual influences as structural (e.g., 
legal, economic, and institutional) or cultural (e.g., religious tradition and 
social norms).20  Structural influences on family formation can be either 
economic (e.g., employment opportunities) or noneconomic (e.g., imbalances 
in sex ratios among marriageable individuals and legal requirements).  
Although each of these influences is conceptually distinct and affects empirical 
trends differently, they interrelate such that their effects on each other and on 
trends in family formation can sometimes be difficult to disentangle.21 
The legal context, for example, both shapes and reflects cultural norms.  The 
next Section examines the origins and evolution of the legal regulation of the 
marital age.  It also discusses legal developments that have indirectly 
influenced trends in the age at first marriage.  Yet the law has not been the 
only, nor likely the primary, contextual factor affecting the median age at 
which individuals first marry.  Even during periods of no significant legal 
change, the median age at marriage has fluctuated.  The subsequent Sections 
examine non-legal influences on age at first marriage, the most salient of 
which have included economic and cultural developments.  Understanding 
both the legal and the non-legal developments that have shaped large-scale 
trends in the age at which individuals marry illuminates the meaning and 
function of marriage in society.  As its meaning and function have changed, 
moreover, so too have the individual characteristics and abilities required to 
enter and sustain marriage. 
A. Legal History of Marital Age Regulation 
Legal regulation of marriage has increased over the course of centuries, 
reflecting marriage’s growing importance as the primary social institution 
within the state.22  Marriage regulations have long established the age at which 
individuals may marry, although as long as such rules have existed, ineligible 
couples wishing to marry have nonetheless managed to skirt them.  Laws 
regulating the marital age, moreover, have frequently advanced social interests 
altogether unrelated to the legal maturity of would-be marriers.23 
 
20 See, e.g., Andrew J. Cherlin, American Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, 
15 FUTURE CHILD. 33, 39-40 (2005) [hereinafter Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First 
Century] (“Most analysts would agree that both economic and cultural forces have been 
driving the changes in American family life over the past half-century.  Analysts disagree 
about the relative weight of the two, but . . . both have been important.”); Jeremy Elliot 
Uecker, Early Marriage in the United States: Why Some Marry Young, Why Many Don’t, 
and What Difference It Makes 40 (May 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Texas at Austin) (on file with The University of Texas Libraries’ Digital Repository). 
21 Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, supra note 20, at 40. 
22 See infra notes 24-28, 43-50 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text. 
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The legal origins of U.S. marriage, and the societal interests they aimed to 
protect, indelibly shaped U.S. marriage itself and marital age law, which of 
course later adapted to the distinctive American milieu.24  Essential aspects of 
the historical and legal elements of marital age regulation remain, however.  It 
is to those aspects that this Article now turns. 
1. Canon Law, Common Law, and Early Statutory Law 
Family formation in the Early Modern period was informal, and family 
structure fluid.25  Marriage existed, but it did so alongside polygamy, 
concubinage, easy divorce, and remarriage.26  Its terms remained relatively 
variable and flexible into the Middle Ages, its sole essential characteristic 
consisting of a privately negotiated property exchange between two families, 
with financial protection for the wife in case of divorce or her spouse’s death.27  
Couples with no property married through even simpler private agreements, 
which were enforced only informally by their communities.28 
Marriage became a more clearly and rigidly defined institution when the 
Roman Catholic Church assumed regulation over it in the thirteenth century.  
Church canon law rendered marriages indissoluble, prohibited polygamy and 
incest, punished fornication and adultery, and declared nonmarital children 
illegitimate and ineligible to inherit property.29  In the centuries that followed, 
however, the requirements for entering a valid marriage were neither widely 
understood by the public nor consistently implemented by the courts.30  The 
original canon law recognized the validity of “spousal” or contract marriages 
requiring only the present agreement of the couple, and introduced the Roman 
age of consent – fourteen for males and twelve for females.31  Together these 
doctrines diminished the importance of parental or guardian consent, which 
had been an essential aspect not only of medieval secular practice but also 
 
24 Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31 (2004). 
25 LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 30-31 
(1977) [hereinafter STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE]. 
26 Id. at 30. 
27 Id. at 30-31. 
28 Id. at 31. 
29 Id.; see also NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE 
NATION 5-6 (2000). 
30 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 31-35.  Additional formality 
requirements included publishing notices (known as “banns”) of the upcoming marriage in 
the weeks preceding the ceremony or, in the alternative, purchasing a license to marry.  Id. 
at 31. 
31 T.E. James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 22, 31 (1960) (“Depending on 
the age of puberty, the age of fourteen for males fixed by Justinian was generally followed 
throughout Western Europe, subject of course to the requisite consents by guardians and 
parents.”). 
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basic to the Roman law.32  The weakening of family and parental control over 
marriage led the propertied classes to resist these canonical introductions.33 
After the Protestant Reformation, marriage regulation came under civil (as 
opposed to purely religious) authority,34 but the English Parliament enacted no 
statutory changes to then-existing marriage law.35  The post-Reformation 
Church, on the other hand, sought greater formalization of couples’ entry into 
marriage.  It imposed new requirements that mandated public church 
ceremonies presided over by clergy and parental consent to the marriages of 
persons younger than twenty-one.36  The ecclesiastical courts that retained 
jurisdiction over marriage litigation, however, continued to recognize the legal 
validity of informal contract marriages that failed to comply with the new 
formality requirements.37 
 
32 LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987, at 53-54 (1990) 
[hereinafter STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE]. 
33 Id. at 54. 
34 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32; see also John Witte, Jr., 
From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western Tradition, in THE 
FAMILY, RELIGION, AND CULTURE 42-44 (Don S. Browning & Ian S. Evison eds., 1997). 
35 STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 56. 
36 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32-33.  Under Roman law, the 
age of majority had been fourteen for males, and twelve for females.  James, supra note 31, 
at 23-25.  In France, royal edicts quickly addressed the failure of the 1563 Council of Trent 
to require parental consent prior to young persons’ marriages, requiring that any man under 
age thirty and any woman under age twenty-five obtain parental consent prior to marriage.  
STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 80. 
37 David Lemmings, Marriage and the Law in the Eighteenth Century: Hardwicke’s 
Marriage Act of 1753, 39 HIST. J. 339, 344 (1996).  A contract marriage merely required the 
oral agreement, expressed in the present tense, by a couple over the age of consent – 
fourteen for females, sixteen for males – in the presence of two witnesses.  3 JOEL PRENTISS 
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN 
MATRIMONIAL SUITS § 63 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1852) (“[Mutual consent] is of the 
essence of marriage; it constitutes of itself, and without the addition of any ceremonies, a 
perfect marriage according to natural law; according to the canon law previous to the 
Council of Trent; [and] perhaps according to the law of England as it stood before the 
passage of the first marriage act . . . .” (footnotes omitted)) [hereinafter BISHOP 1852]; 
STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32-33; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, 
supra note 32, at 52; see also BISHOP 1852, supra, § 164 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige Ch. 
574 (N.Y. Ch. 1841)).  While the state might statutorily require compliance with certain 
formalities, marriage was believed to exist in a state of nature and thus preceded the state.  
Id. § 68.  Once a couple agreed to marry, theirs was a “marriage in the sight of God,” even 
“in the absence of all civil and religious institutions.”  Id.  “[T]he law of nature enables all 
persons in whom no natural impediment exists, to intermarry by mere words of consent, 
whenever they please.” 3 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE 
AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS § 144b (3d ed., rev. and enlarged, 
Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1859).  
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By the seventeenth century, the public – especially the propertied elite – and 
clergy both increasingly regarded the church wedding, preceded by either a 
series of public announcements known as “banns” or by the procurement of a 
marriage license, as essential prerequisites to a valid marriage.38  The civil 
common law courts, which decided property claims,39 thus came to require a 
public church wedding before assigning full property and inheritance rights, 
treating contract marriages as valid but “irregular.”40 
Many couples – most notably minors wishing to marry against their parents’ 
wishes – began paying corrupt clergymen to secretly preside over and register 
marriage ceremonies.41  These “clandestine marriages,” despite noncompliance 
with formality requirements, were legally valid and binding (likely because 
they had been solemnized by church clergy).42  Thus, unlike contract marriages 
that had not been solemnized, clandestine marriage conferred full property and 
inheritance rights.43 
As growing numbers of young people secretly married against their parents’ 
wishes, parents of the propertied classes, anxious to control and pass on family 
property, sought to reassert control over their children’s marriages.44  They 
ultimately turned to Parliament to put an end to legal recognition of clandestine 
and contract marriages,45 and in 1753 Parliament passed the “‘Act for the 
better preventing of clandestine Marriages.’”46  Among the Act’s stated 
purposes was the “prevent[ion of] marriages among the children of the social 
elite which were not sanctioned by their parents and other relations.”47  
 
38 STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 53.  At the Council of Trent in 1563, the 
post-Reformation Catholic Church added the requirement of the public church ceremony 
presided over by a priest.  Id. at 55. 
39 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32.  After the Protestant 
Reformation, marriage regulation came under civil (as opposed to purely religious) 
authority, although marriage litigation remained within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical 
courts.  Id. at 32; WITTE, supra note 34, at 42-44. 
40 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32-34. 
41 Id. at 33.  Numerous churches and neighborhoods, such as the Fleet in London, 
became infamous for their clergymen’s willingness to flout official requirements and 
perform marriage ceremonies for pay.  Id.   
42 STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 96. 
43 The oddity of recognizing as valid these otherwise-illegal marriages likely reflected 
the participation of clergy and the recording of the ceremonies in a registry.  Id. at 98; 
Lemmings, supra note 37, at 345.  The ecclesiastical courts instead focused enforcement and 
punishment efforts on clergy who performed the illegal ceremonies.  STONE, FAMILY, SEX 
AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32-33; Lemmings, supra note 37, at 344-45. 
44 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 35. 
45 Id. 
46 Lemmings, supra note 37, at 340. 
47 Id. at 347.  The Act gave parents an effective veto over the marriages of minors, with 
fathers’ rights having priority over mothers’.  Id. at 348-49.  The Act preferred fathers or 
testamentary guardians to mothers.  Id.  And while minors could appeal the veto of a 
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Commonly known as Hardwicke’s Marriage Act, the measure stated the basic 
elements of English marriage law for nearly a century after its passage.48  
Hardwicke’s Marriage Act declared altogether void both contract marriages 
and marriages entered by those under twenty-one absent parental consent.49  In 
doing so, it represented, according to one historian, “a uniquely authoritarian 
assertion of the economic and political interests of parents over their children” 
and an “unprecedented enforcement of parental and familial interest.”50 
Hardwicke’s Marriage Act reinforced the centrality of marriage as the 
institution through which families controlled property and wealth.  Inheritance 
laws allowed families to enter advantageous alliances through marriages that 
would produce heirs to whom family property would predictably devolve.  
Because Church law dictated that only legitimate children could inherit, 
ensuring the legal validity of marriage was critical.  Hardwicke’s Marriage 
Act, by rendering altogether void noncompliant marriages and thus potentially 
depriving a family of legitimate heirs, could be harsh in its effects.51  The 
British Parliament, in the 1820s, sought to ameliorate these harsh effects and 
eventually repealed the Act in that same decade.52  The laws of the American 
 
guardian or mother to the Court of Chancery, they could take no appeal from a paternal 
veto, though the father’s “refusal be ever so whimsical or selfish.”  Id. at 349 (citing 15 THE 
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 59 (London, T.C. Hansard 1813)).  Through this 
refusal to constrain fathers, the Act recognized the economic interests of the family and 
reinforced paternal prerogative to make decisions affecting those interests.  Lemmings, 
supra note 37, at 345-50. 
48 STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 123. 
49 Lemmings, supra note 37, at 346-48.  By either dissenting to the bann or refusing to 
consent to the issuance of a license, parents who objected to a match could prevent a minor 
child’s marriage.  Id. at 340. 
50 Id. at 341-42.  Hardwicke’s Marriage Act explicitly required parental consent to the 
issuance of marriage licenses – but not banns – to minors, a fact to which some 
commentators have drawn attention.  See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age 
Restrictions, 22 J. FAM. L. 1, 7 (1984).  Other commentators have observed that it was 
unnecessary for the Act to address banns, given that parental opposition to a bann sufficed 
to block the subsequent marriage (putting the community on notice of a potentially improper 
union in time to lodge objections was, in large part, the purpose of the publication 
requirement).  Lemmings, supra note 37, at 342 n.11.  In addition, the parental notification 
requirement preexisted Hardwicke’s Marriage Act, reflecting concern with underage 
marriage, by more than a century. 
51 The nullification of a marriage, moreover, impeded the ability of the (now-unchaste) 
woman to remarry, threatening her with a life of economic vulnerability. 
52 Lemmings, supra note 37, at 360.  In 1822, Parliament amended the Act by removing 
the provision nullifying the marriages of minors lacking parental consent.  The amended law 
continued to require minors to swear that they had obtained parental consent and to provide 
written evidence of that consent before a license would issue.  Although a noncompliant 
marriage would not be nullified under the new law, willful perjury or fraud carried severe 
penalties.  Id.  In 1823, Parliament formally repealed the remainder of the Act.  Id.  It 
imposed the additional penalty of forfeiture of material benefits from the marriage on 
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colonies and subsequent states never formally adopted Hardwicke’s Marriage 
Act and instead tended to incorporate English common law rules that, by 
comparison, aimed to facilitate marital validity.53 
2. American Colonies and Early States 
The common law exported by Britain to its American colonies shaped early 
marriage laws, and the common law’s influence endures today.54  Among the 
characteristics of early common law doctrine that persist are the relative ease 
with which couples can enter legally valid marriages, the presumption in favor 
of a marriage’s validity despite the presence of legal impediments or 
noncompliance with formalities, and the delegation of a gatekeeping function 
to parents whose children intend to marry despite having yet to attain the 
presumptive age of consent.55 
American colonial law was an evolving blend of English common law, 
statutory rules adopted by colonial assemblies, and domestic common law.56  
The colonies all enacted marriage codes that mirrored English law, imposing 
similar formality requirements, preventing entry into “clandestine” or 
otherwise “unlawful” marriages, and extending to parents (especially fathers) 
the right to police their children’s marriages.57  Noncompliance, however, was 
 
minors marrying without the requisite parental consent, but removed nullification 
requirements for marriages entered absent full compliance with procedural requirements.  
Parliament did, however, require the nullification of marriages entered by couples who had 
willfully flouted the formal marriage requirements (i.e., the publication of banns or purchase 
of a license, followed by a church marriage).  Id.  With the exception of the removal of 
nullification requirements for marriages entered into without parental consent or with minor 
procedural defects (the main purpose of which, according to historian David Lemmings, was 
to make divorce less easily available based on these defects), English marriage law into the 
late 19th century diverged relatively little from the earlier provisions of Hardwicke’s 
Marriage Act.  Id. 
53 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 
2.1-.4 (2d ed. 1988); Wardle, supra note 50, at 7. 
54 The states simply retained much of the preexisting common law after the nation’s 
founding.  BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, §§ 164, 167; COTT, supra note 29, at 5-6. 
55 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 53, §§ 2.1-.4.  These early doctrines, however, responded 
to social and legal concerns of a historical context dramatically different from our own.  
Early parental consent requirements, for example, recognized parents’ historical rights to the 
labor and earnings of their children.  Perhaps as important, parental consent requirements – 
by empowering parents to veto improvident marriages – reflected the importance of forming 
family alliances through marital unions in order to expand family wealth, and the 
presumption of a marriage’s validity reflected the importance of identifying legitimate heirs 
to preserve it.  Although parental consent requirements endure, these justifications would 
hardly support their continued existence. 
56 MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 12 (1985). 
57 Id. at 67.  Restating general legal principles as they existed in the nineteenth century, 
Joel Prentiss Bishop explained that a valid marriage required: 
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common.58  Some couples may have resisted traditional religious and civic 
control over matrimony, others may have balked at the administrative costs of 
formalization, and still others in more sparsely settled regions may simply have 
lacked access to officials authorized to sanction and perform marriage 
ceremonies.59  Led by the judiciary, American law responded to noncompliant 
marriages, not by strictly enforcing marriage regulations, but instead by 
extending legal recognition to all but those marriages marred by the most 
egregious impediments.60  In American courts, “contract” or “irregular” 
marriage evolved into “common law marriage,” and judges relaxed evidentiary 
requirements for demonstrating its existence.61 
Every state adopted the English age of legal majority – twenty-one – as the 
statutory age of presumptive marital consent, when individuals’ marriages no 
longer required parental involvement.62  At the same time, however, most 
states failed to explicitly repudiate the English common law ages of 
presumptive marital consent – twelve for females and fourteen for males.63  In 
the absence of statutory language explicitly expressing legislative intent to 
invalidate the common law, state courts consistently upheld the validity of 
marriages of individuals under twenty-one who met the common law age of 
presumptive consent – irrespective of state statutes that required parental 
consent to the marriages of those individuals.64 
 
1. An agreement; 2. according to the forms made necessary by the municipal law; 3. 
between a man and woman, both of whom are of sound mind; 4. of the requisite age; 5. 
capable of contracting marriage generally; 6. and with each other; 7. and capable of 
sexual intercourse. . . .  The failure of any one of them makes the marriage invalid. 
2 BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, § 43. 
58 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 68. 
59 Id. at 68-69. 
60 Id. at 69-70. 
61 Id. at 69-70, 79.  Judges facilitated couples’ efforts to prove their marriages by 
“formally receiving into American common law the old rule that marriage could be 
presumed from the acknowledgements, cohabitation, and reputation of a couple.”  Id. at 79.  
Statutorily imposed formality requirements thus became “directory, not mandatory.”  Id. at 
74. 
62 Id. at 106; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt a. (1981); Robert 
F. Drinan, American Laws Regulating the Formation of the Marriage Contract, 383 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 48, 50, 55 (1969). 
63 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 106.  English common law retained the Roman 
minimum age of marital consent.  BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, § 192; Id. § 174 (stating that 
“[t]he consent of parents is not, at common law, essential to the validity of the marriages of 
minors” (footnotes omitted)).  The validity of a marriage required only “‘suitable 
contracting parties, and a free consent, to render it valid.’”  GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 
103 (quoting FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW 15 (1835)). 
64 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 106-07, 143.  The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the 
common law had long recognized the validity of informal marriages and held that, “a statute 
may take away a common law right; but there is always a presumption that the legislature 
has no such intention, unless it be plainly expressed.”  Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 79 
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Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, reformers began lobbying to raise 
the ages of both sexual and marital consent.65  Galvanized by the spread of 
venereal disease and a growing prostitution trade that employed young girls, 
they launched a broad “social purity movement”66 that advocated not only 
“premarital chastity and marital fidelity”67 but more broadly sought to instill “a 
more generalized sense of sexual restraint and self-control and stigmatized all 
forms of non-marital sexuality.”68  Purity reformers also suggested that the 
children of young couples were prone to ill health, and questioned the mental 
capacity of young marriers, reasoning that the age of “‘majority’ is the law’s 
simple devise for securing mental maturity in the graver affairs of life.”69  Of 
the many decisions required of individuals, the reformers argued that marriage 
is “as serious a business as making a will or signing a deed.”70 
Most states responded by raising statutory ages of sexual and marital 
consent, though only modestly.71  The majority of states, whose ages of sexual 
consent were between ten and twelve, raised them to somewhere between 
thirteen and sixteen,72 and many raised their ages of marital consent to sixteen 
for females and eighteen for males.73  The judiciary, however, continued to 
consider nonage (that is, failure to reach the legally established minimum age) 
a less serious impediment to marriage than other impediments such as bigamy 
or incest, which rendered the resulting marriages altogether void.74  Judges 
instead treated underage marriages as valid but voidable so long as either party 
remained underage, and as fully valid once both parties had reached the legal 
age of consent.75 
By the end of the twentieth century, a majority of states had adopted statutes 
raising the age of marital consent and ending recognition of common law 
 
(1877). 
65 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 141 (1985). 
66 J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, You Can Steal Her Virginity but Not Her Doll: The Nineteenth 
Century Campaign to Raise the Legal Age of Sexual Consent, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 
229, 233 (2009). 
67 Id. at 230 (quoting ALAN HUNT, GOVERNING MORALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MORAL 
REGULATION 77 (1999)). 
68 Id. at 229-31. 
69 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 141 (citing FRED S. HALL & ELIZABETH W. BROOKE, 
AMERICAN MARRIAGE LAWS IN THEIR SOCIAL ASPECTS 18 (1919)). 
70 Id. 
71 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 141-42; Ehrlich, supra note 66, at 235. 
72 Ehrlich, supra note 68, at 235. 
73 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 142. 
74 Id. at 142, 144-46; see also 1 BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, § 199.  At common law, 
however, if either party was below the age of seven, the resulting marriage was altogether 
void.  Id. § 194. 
75 BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, § 196; see also, e.g., Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 
S.W.3d 100, 104 (Ky. 2006) (holding that a marriage of thirteen-year-old girl to an adult 
man was voidable, not void); BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, § 199.   
  
2012] AGE OF MARITAL CAPACITY 1831 
 
marriages, which displaced the common law age of presumptive consent.76  
Both common law doctrines, however, have persisted in a minority of states 
into the twenty-first century.77  In Colorado, for example, a court adopted the 
common law age of sexual consent – twelve for females and fourteen for males 
– as the presumptive age of marital consent for common law marriage.78  
Although state statute establishes eighteen as the presumptive age of consent 
for marriage, permitting individuals as young as sixteen to marry only with 
either parental or judicial consent, the court held that “‘[t]he common law of 
England . . . shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full 
force until repealed by legislative authority.’”79 
3. Modern Regulation 
Age twenty-one continued to be the universal age of legal majority and 
statutory age of marital capacity until the mid-twentieth century.80  Prompted 
by wartime needs, Congress lowered the draft age during World War II from 
twenty-one to eighteen.81  Legal restrictions that denied rights to eighteen- to 
twenty-year-olds came under scrutiny soon thereafter.82  By the early 1970s, 
approximately half of the states had lowered their ages of marital consent to 
eighteen.83 
 
76 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 101-02. 
77 Id. 
78 In re the Marriage of J.M.H., 143 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Colo. App. 2006) (quoting COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 2-4-211 (2012)) (holding that the common law age of consent for marriage 
was fourteen for males and twelve for females, and remanding the case to the trial court for 
an evidentiary hearing on the existence of a common law marriage between a fifteen-year-
old girl and her putative common law adult spouse); see also In re Pace, 989 P.2d 297, 298 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that “[t]he common-law ages of consent are 14 for a male and 
12 for a female[, and that a] minor who has reached the age of consent does not need the 
consent of a parent to enter into a valid common-law marriage”).  Kansas later raised the 
state minimum age of consent to eighteen by statute.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101(b) (2007) 
(“The state of Kansas shall not recognize a common-law marriage contract if either party to 
the marriage contract is under 18 years of age.”). 
79 J.M.H., 143 P.3d at 118 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-211 (2012)). 
80 WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH’S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: A HISTORY OF VOTING AGE 
IN AMERICA 72 (1992). 
81 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt. a, reporter’s note (1981) (“The 
impetus for the lowering of the age of majority probably came from the widespread draft of 
those under twenty-one and from the lowering of the voting age to eighteen.”). 
82 Advocates argued that if eighteen-year-olds were to bear the obligations of adulthood, 
in particular wartime military service, they ought also to receive all the legal benefits of 
adulthood.  CULTICE, supra note 80, at 20-21 (quoting 88 CONG. REC. 8316 (1942) 
(statement of Sen. Arthur Vandenberg)). 
83 Note, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act – Marital Age Provisions, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 179, 187 n.42 (1972) (citing statutory provisions of states that had, by 1972, lowered 
the marriage age).  In 1974 the Twenty-Sixth Amendment made eighteen the national voting 
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The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), promulgated by the 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970, captured the national trend.84  
The UMDA’s marital age provisions proposed: (1) setting eighteen as the 
presumptive age of marital consent; (2) permitting sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds to marry after obtaining either parental or judicial consent; and (3) 
permitting those younger than sixteen to marry after obtaining both parental 
and judicial consent.85  Judicial consent required a finding (1) that the minor 
had the capacity to assume the responsibilities of marriage, and (2) that 
marriage was in the minor’s best interest.86  Failure to obtain the requisite 
parental and/or judicial consent rendered the resulting union voidable, but not 
automatically void.87 
The presumptive age of marital consent is now eighteen in all states but two 
– Nebraska, where it is nineteen, and Mississippi, where it is seventeen for 
males and fifteen for females.88  Every state permits adolescents younger than 
eighteen to marry with either parental or judicial consent, with most setting the 
minimum marital age at sixteen.89  Nearly forty states permit minors younger 
than sixteen to marry with both parental and judicial consent, or in case of 
pregnancy or birth of a child.90 
Other legal developments have influenced, albeit less directly, age at 
marriage.  Historically, couples facing unintended nonmarital pregnancy 
commonly faced intense pressure to marry in order to avoid the social and 
legal stigma that attended nonmarital sex and illegitimate birth.  In a series of 
cases beginning in the 1960s, however, the U.S. Supreme Court steadily 
eroded states’ abilities to criminalize or otherwise burden private, consensual 
 
age.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
84 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (amended 1973). 
85 Id. § 203. 
86 Id. § 205. 
87 Id. § 208.  Minors or their parents could bring suit to have the marriage declared 
invalid, but parents retained the right to do so only until the minor reached the age at which 
he or she could marry without the required consent.  Id. 
88
 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (2008); see also Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 587 app. D (2005); Pamela E. Beatse, Note, Marital Rights for Teens: 
Judicial Intervention That Properly Balances Privacy and Protection, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 
625, 628 n.18 (gathering statutes regulating marriage).  The Mississippi statute has not been 
challenged, although its differential treatment of males and females renders it 
constitutionally vulnerable under current equal protection doctrine.  See, e.g., Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
89 See generally Marriage Laws of the Fifty States, the District of Columbia and Puerto 
Rico, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/table_marriage (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2012) (gathering state statutes). 
90 Id. (showing the statutes of thirty-seven states contain provisions allowing minors 
younger than sixteen to marry with approval or in case of pregnancy or childbirth). 
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sexual conduct.91  It also held unconstitutional the once-common impediments 
that stigmatized nonmarital children.92 
Modern law thus punishes neither nonmarital sex93 nor nonmarital birth, and 
premarital sex is nearly universal.94  For adolescents, nonmarital procreation 
has become much more common than procreation within marriage: in 2007, 
the overwhelming majority of adolescents who gave birth were unmarried – 
only seven percent of fifteen-to-seventeen-year-olds and twelve percent of 
eighteen-to-nineteen-year-olds who gave birth did so within marriages.95 
The dismantling of the negative legal consequences of nonmarital sex was 
an important structural change that evinced an increasingly tolerant sexual 
culture and growing respect for individual liberty.  Along with other significant 
social changes, it rendered marriage less compulsory and contributed to the 
principal development in family formation over the past half-century – the 
erosion of marriage as the only acceptable locus for sex and childrearing.96  
The Sections that follow identify other significant contextual influences on 
family formation and age at marriage, examining first the role of changing 
economic opportunities then the cultural developments that have both 
fundamentally changed the function and very meaning of marriage in modern 
society. 
B. Economic Influences on Age at First Marriage 
For Western men, economic independence has long been considered a 
prerequisite to marriage.97  Empirical data reveals a consistently inverse 
relationship between the availability of economic opportunity for men and age 
at first marriage.98  Men have married at younger ages when greater economic 
 
91 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
92 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (invalidating state law 
requiring a nonmarital child, as a condition of inheriting by intestate succession from a non-
custodial biological father, to demonstrate that his or her parents married after the child’s 
birth). 
93 Explicit legal protection for same-sex intimate conduct is of more recent vintage.  See 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
94 Heaton, supra note 8, at 406. 
95 Stephanie J. Ventura, Changing Patterns of Nonmarital Childbearing in the United 
States, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 1, 3 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nch 
s/data/databriefs/db18.pdf. 
96 CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND, supra note 7, at 7. 
97 STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 54. 
98 Valerie Kincaide Oppenheimer, A Theory of Marriage Timing, 94 AM. J. SOC. 563 
(1988).  Oppenheimer’s theory has since received significant empirical confirmation.  See, 
e.g., Kim L. Lloyd & Scott J. South, Contextual Influences on Young Men’s Transition to 
First Marriage, 74 SOC. FORCES 1097, 1101-02 (1996); Valerie Kincaide Oppenheimer, 
Matthijs Kalmijn & Nelson Lim, Men’s Career Development and Marriage Timing During 
a Period of Rising Inequality, 34 DEMOGRAPHY 311 (1997); Yu Xie et al., Economic 
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opportunities have been available to them; when economic opportunities have 
been scarce, men take longer to reach the economic security deemed necessary 
to sustain marriage and consequently marry later in life.99 
Reliable, specific records documenting age at first marriage exist only as of 
the late nineteenth century.  Before the nineteenth century, however, the ready 
availability of land in the expanding nation meant abundant economic 
opportunities for young men.100  Evidence suggests that during this early 
period in the nation’s history, men married relatively early, in their twenties.101  
Men also outnumbered women, and the sex-ratio imbalance helps explain the 
even younger ages at which colonial and early American women apparently 
married.102  As the frontier disappeared and land became scarcer, though, it 
took young men more time to gain economic security, doing so at later ages.103  
They married later, too.  The median age at first marriage climbed steadily, 
peaking around 1890 at ages twenty-six for men and twenty-two for women.104 
The subsequent rise of industrialization at the turn of the twentieth century 
again created abundant employment opportunities for young men and offered a 
new path to economic security.105  Manufacturing accelerated in the years 
during and after World War II, and economic opportunities continued to 
expand.106  In the industrialized economy, advanced formal education and the 
years required to attain it were unnecessary to obtain well-paid work; only one 
out of three adults completed high school, and one out of sixteen graduated 
from college.107  The median age of marriage again decreased, falling most 
drastically in the economically prosperous period between World War II and 
1960, when it reached a low of twenty-two for men and twenty for women.108 
 
Potential and Entry into Marriage and Cohabitation, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 351 (2003). 
99 Catherine A. Fitch & Steven Ruggles, Historical Trends in Marriage Formation: The 
United States 1950-1990, in THE TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND 
COHABITATION 59 (Linda J. Waite et al. eds., 2000). 
100 Michael R. Haines, Long Term Marriage Patterns in the United States from Colonial 
Times to the Present, 14-15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. h0080, 
1996), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=190420. 
101 Id.; Uecker, supra note 20, at 8. 
102 Haines, supra note 100, at 35-36. 
103 Id. at 36. 
104 Uecker, supra note 20, at 8; see also Christine Bachrach et al., The Changing Shape 
of Ties That Bind, in THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 99, at 1; Haines, supra note 100, at 27. 
105 Haines, supra note 100, at 35-36. 
106 Fitch & Ruggles, supra note 99, at 65. 
107 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PERCENT OF PEOPLE 25 YEARS AND 
OVER WHO HAVE COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL OR COLLEGE, BY RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN AND 
SEX: SELECTED YEARS 1940 TO 2002, at Table A-2 (2003), available at www.census.gov/po 
pulation/socdemo/education/tabA-2.pdf. 
108 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ESTIMATED MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST 
MARRIAGE, BY SEX: 1890 TO THE PRESENT, at Table MS-2 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ms2.xls; see also Fitch & Ruggles, 
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After 1960, technological advances led to increased automation in 
manufacturing, and the demand for blue-collar labor declined.109  Domestic 
demand for labor declined further as the lower cost of labor abroad led to the 
exporting of manufacturing to other countries.110  As blue-collar laborers no 
longer commanded premium wages, more women joined the paid workforce to 
help support their families.111  These economically driven changes in the 
nature of family work helped mark the decline of the (short-lived) single-
earner “‘family wage system’” of the post-War years.112 
Women’s participation in the paid labor force began making the economic 
opportunities available to them – in addition to those available to men – 
relevant factors in marital timing.113  The potential for economic self-
sufficiency made marriage less essential to women’s survival.114  Women 
began to compete with men for jobs, since work in a service- and information-
based economy was less likely to require physical strength than to require 
mental and social skills – aptitudes that did not differ by sex.115 
Entry into the better-paying information-based professions for both men and 
women has required higher levels, and more years, of education and 
training.116  More young people began staying in school into their early and 
mid-twenties to complete their educations, and more postponed marriage and 
parenthood.117 
Influenced in part by these economic changes, the national median marital 
age again climbed, and it has done so steadily since 1960.118  Americans are 
 
supra note 99, at 65. 
109 Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, supra note 20, at 39. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Oppenheimer, Kalmijn & Lim, supra note 98, at 311; Megan M. Sweeney, Two 
Decades of Family Change: The Shifting Economic Foundations of Marriage, 67 AM. SOC. 
REV. 132 (2002). 
114 See Sweeney, supra note 113, at 132. 
115 Dana Vannoy, Social Differentiation, Contemporary Marriage, and Human 
Development, 12 J. FAM. ISSUES 251, 261 (1991). 
116 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late 
Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 478 (2000).  The U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics predicts that the number of computer specialist occupations, specifically 
software engineers, systems analysts, and data analysts, will increase by forty-two percent 
between 2006 and 2016, and that nearly all of these will require some form of advanced 
degree.  See Arlene Dohm & Lynn Shniper, Employment Outlook: 2006-16: Occupational 
Employment Projections to 2016, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 2007, at 86, 97 tbl.3, 98 
(2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/11/art5full.pdf.  
117 Arnett, supra note 116, at 478. 
118
 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 108.  The median marriage age reached twenty-two 
in 1980 – returning, after nearly a century, to its 1890 mark – and has continued upwards.  
Id. 
  
1836 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1817 
 
marrying later in life now than they have at any time in the nation’s history.  
Indeed by 2009 the median age at marriage reached a historic high of twenty-
eight for men and twenty-six for women.119 
The industrial and postindustrial economies wrought radical changes in both 
the nature of work and the composition of the workforce.  Men’s work first 
moved outside of the home, shop, or farm and into the factory.  Women 
followed men into the paid workforce in subsequent decades, although 
generally driven less by the carrot of economic prosperity than by the stick of 
economic necessity.120  Large-scale changes in the nature of individuals’ work 
and participation in the national economic life have interrelated, moreover, 
with changes in their home lives – including ongoing evolutions in the nature 
of marriage relationships, family functioning more generally, and the role that 
marriage itself plays, and is expected to play, in individuals’ lives. 
C. Evolution of the Meaning and Function of Marriage 
Cultural factors – social norms, moral values, religious traditions, etc. – are 
among those that shape the contexts in which individuals develop preferences 
and make life decisions.121  Social anthropologists have long agreed that 
marriage as we know it did not evolve as a “natural” or innate human 
preference.122  To the contrary, marriage was a social invention that served to 
counteract behavior that characterized humans’ evolutionary heritage – the 
sexual wandering of males whose reproductive strategy was to maximize their 
fertility and impregnate as many women as possible.123  Because of women’s 
limited reproductive capacity and their own dependency during the extended 
period from childbirth through a child’s infancy and early childhood, men’s 
commitment to marriage benefited women and children by requiring men to 
support and protect them.124 
The precise nature and meaning of marriage, and the functions it performed 
in society, however, have evolved.  The following Sections trace this 
evolution.  They demonstrate that over time marriage has become less critical 
to individuals and to society, that individuals’ expectations of their marital 
relationships are now higher and more difficult to meet, and that norms that 
once prevented individuals from exiting marriage are now weaker than they 
have been since the Church formalized the institution in the thirteenth century. 
 
119 Id. 
120 Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, supra note 20, at 39-40. 
121 Id. at 40. 
122 Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE 
& FAM. 848, 854 (2004) [hereinafter Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage] (citing 
LIONEL TIGER & ROBIN FOX, THE IMPERIAL ANIMAL (1971)). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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1. Essential Functional Institution 
After the Church established the contours of legal marriage, the social and 
legal institution it defined remained firmly entrenched for centuries.125  From 
the colonial era well into the nineteenth century and the period of rising 
industrialization, American marriages, once formed, generally conformed to 
that institutional structure.126  Marriage was the social institution through 
which families protected and passed on family property, the support of girls 
and women was transferred from their families of origin to their husbands, and 
couples produced the offspring who would in turn inherit.127  The 
institutionalized marriage provided clearly defined and fixed marital roles for 
husbands and wives.128  The husband was the undisputed head of the 
household and its sole legal representative.129  His primary marital role was to 
support and supervise his wife and children.130  A wife’s separate legal 
personhood disappeared upon marriage, becoming subsumed into that of her 
husband through the doctrine of coverture.131  Her primary marital role was to 
provide her husband domestic services, maintain the home, and care for the 
family’s children.132 
Thus institutionalized, this marriage-type clearly defined spouses’ respective 
roles and established the hierarchy within families.133  Individuals entering 
marriage knew what was expected of them, and what they might reasonably 
expect.  Divorce was all but unavailable, and even had it been a legally 
available option, women’s economic dependence on their husbands and other 
social pressures would have rendered it unfeasible, at least for most women. 
That institutional marriages endured until the death of one of the spouses 
provides us little or no information about the quality of couples’ 
relationships.134  Marital stability did not depend on relationship quality.  
Instead, powerful legal and cultural norms – the “forces of law, tradition, and 
religious belief,”135 along with support provided by kinship networks, worked 
in concert to hold institutional marriages together.136 
 
125 See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Hamilton, supra note 24, at 49. 
126 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 851-52. 
127 COTT, supra note 29, at 6-7. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 7. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. (describing the doctrine of coverture as a complete transfer of the wife’s civic 
personhood to the husband). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Vannoy, supra note 115, at 258. 
135 Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, supra note 20, at 40. 
136 Id.; Vannoy, supra note 115, at 258. 
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2. The Rise of Companionship 
The rising industrial economy that drew men into wage labor and paid them 
a wage sufficient to support a family produced the “single-earner, 
breadwinner-homemaker marriage,” which reached its heyday in the 1950s.137  
Income earning shifted from the joint family work of home and agricultural 
production to the husband’s laboring outside the home for wages.  Spouses’ 
roles within marriages involved a clear and complementary division of 
labor.138  Marital success entailed each spouse’s performance of his or her 
defined role, and spouses derived marital satisfaction from capably performing 
their respective roles (breadwinner, homemaker, parents) well.139 
A clear division of labor was only one of the characteristics of this marriage-
type.  Perhaps because labor opportunities frequently required families to move 
to urban communities and thus weakened close-by kinship networks, or 
perhaps because the home was no longer the primary site of round-the-clock 
production and labor, husbands and wives increasingly encountered the need 
and opportunities for togetherness and emotional connection.140  They began 
expecting to be each other’s companions to an extent not contemplated by 
institutional marriage.141  The growing importance of emotional connection, 
friendship, and romantic love to perceived marital success led scholars to label 
this emerging form of marriage “companionate marriage.”142 
While the emphasis on the companionate aspects of marriage continued to 
intensify over time, other characteristics and functions of institutional marriage 
endured relatively unchanged well into midcentury.143  Marriage itself 
remained the only acceptable context for sex, procreation, and family life more 
generally.144  Nonmarital cohabitation and childbearing continued to be 
 
137 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 851.  This 
“traditional” marriage-type, however, was actually a short-lived mid-twentieth century 
aberration shaped by the confluence of a rising industrial economy and a post-War 
sociopolitical and economic context; at no other time in the nation’s history have families 
lived comfortably on the market wages of only one spouse, conceived and raised as many 
children to adulthood, or married as young.  CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND, supra 
note 7, at 6 (“We sometimes think of the 1950s as the era of the traditional family, perhaps 
because that’s as far back as our collective memory now reaches.  But in truth it was the 
most unusual time for family life in the past century.”). 
138 Vannoy, supra note 115, at 252. 
139 Id.; see also Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, supra note 20, at 
40. 
140 Vannoy, supra note 115, at 256. 
141 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 851. 
142 Sociologist Ernest Burgess coined the term in the mid-twentieth century.  See ERNEST 
W. BURGESS & HARVEY J. LOCKE, THE FAMILY: FROM INSTITUTION TO COMPANIONSHIP 
(1945). 
143 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 851. 
144 Id. at 852.  Historian Stephanie Coontz noted that even entering the 1960s, “nothing 
seemed more obvious . . . than the preeminence of marriage in people’s lives and the 
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relatively rare and were generally confined to socioeconomically 
disadvantaged members of society.145 
By midcentury, however, a number of social developments converged, 
eventually contributing to marriage’s becoming less essential to individuals’ 
economic survival and social acceptability, and spousal roles becoming less 
clearly defined.146  By the late twentieth century, these changes had helped to 
fundamentally transform the nature and meaning of the marital relationship 
itself.147 
3. Negotiated Spousal Roles 
The late 1950s and 1960s were a time of political and cultural ferment.  
Dissident political movements (for example, the antiwar movement, the New 
Left, and the black, gay, and women’s rights movements) and the civil 
disobedience they utilized fed cultural disobedience, one of whose tenets was 
defiance of sexual norms.148  The birth control pill became widely available, 
enabling couples to separate sex from pregnancy and marriage.149  Nonmarital 
sex and cohabitation became more common and less stigmatized.150 
The definition of, and expectations for, marriage continued to evolve into 
the latter decades of the twentieth century.  The well-defined boundaries of 
spousal roles blurred.151  In a growing number of marriages, both the husband 
and the wife worked outside the home.152  Women continued to shoulder a 
disproportionate share of the housework and child care that had once been the 
near-exclusive purview of wives, but their husbands’ contributions increased 
steadily.153  Couples’ roles within the dual-earner household became more 
negotiable, flexible, and egalitarian.154 
Women’s entry into and increasing equality within the workforce has meant 
that marriage no longer functions as the sole path to their economic survival.  
Dual-earner couples have had to renegotiate the once-clearly defined gender 
roles that made domestic duties solely the responsibility of wives.  The norms 
 
permanence of the male breadwinner family.”  STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: 
FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY, OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 243 (2005).  
145 COONTZ, supra note 144, at 263-64; Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, 
supra note 122, at 852. 
146 COONTZ, supra note 144, at 263-64.  But see infra note 189 and accompanying text.   
147 COONTZ, supra note 144, at 263-64. 
148 Id. at 263; COTT, supra note 29, at 201. 
149 COTT, supra note 29, at 202. 
150 Id. 
151 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 851-52. 
152 COTT, supra note 29, at 204. 
153 Id. at 205. 
154 See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANN MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS 
AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 11 (1989); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY 
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 16 (1999). 
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that defined for individuals their roles within marriage blurred, then all but 
disappeared, making the roles of husbands and wives flexible and negotiable.  
Marriage gradually lost its instrumental value as the sole socially acceptable 
path to intimate relationship, economic security, and family life.155 
Research suggests that expectations of women and men for role sharing and 
equality within contemporary marriages heightened the level of tension within 
marriages.156  Spouses’ expectations of their marital relationships and their 
companions grew.  The performance of pre-defined gendered spousal roles 
(provider, homemaker) no longer sufficed to define a satisfactory or good-
enough marriage.157  Spouses might be dutiful homemakers and providers, but 
they nonetheless began viewing the concept of marriage as fundamentally 
flawed if it no longer met their desire for love and intimacy.  The measure of 
marital satisfaction thus shifted “from [the spousal] role to self” and self-
fulfillment.158  
The progressive destigmatizing and greater availability of divorce began to 
make exit from unhappy marriages easier.159  It thus largely came to be that 
neither social nor economic necessity compelled individuals to enter or remain 
in marriages.160  The companionate yet essentially role-based marriages of the 
early and mid-twentieth century thus evolved into what sociologists have 
termed the modern “individualized marriage.”161 
Marriage is no longer essential to social acceptance or economic survival 
and has thus lost some of its instrumental value.162  It nonetheless remains 
central to the self-identities of many individuals, for whom it largely retains its 
symbolic and personal value.163  If anything, these have increased as couples 
embrace individualized marriage as the cultural standard.164 
 
155 See Vivian Hamilton, Will Marriage Promotion Work?, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
1, 8-9 (2007); Wendy D. Manning et al., The Changing Institution of Marriage: 
Adolescents’ Expectations to Cohabit and to Marry, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 559, 560 
(2007). 
156 Paul R. Amato & Alan Booth, Changes in Gender Role Attitudes and Perceived 
Marital Quality, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 58, 65 (1995). 
157 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 853. 
158 FRANCESCA M. CANCIAN, LOVE IN AMERICA: GENDER AND SELF-DEVELOPMENT 11 
(1987). 
159 Paul R. Amato, Transformative Processes in Marriage: Some Thoughts from a 
Sociologist, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 305, 309 (2007) (observing that spouses in modern 
marriages expect the marital relationship to fulfill their needs for personal growth and self-
actualization, and that “[i]f the marital relationship no longer meets these needs, then 
spouses feel justified in jettisoning the relationship to seek out new partners who better meet 
these needs”). 
160 COONTZ, supra note 144, at 247. 
161 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 852. 
162 Id. at 854. 
163 Id. at 855-57. 
164 Id. at 855. 
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Modern individualized marriage nonetheless challenges marital stability and 
success by normalizing expectations for marital relationships that are difficult 
to meet and sustain over time.  The following Part gathers empirical evidence 
of some of the significant effects these new challenges have on modern 
marriage, and also of the factors associated with couples’ differing abilities to 
withstand these challenges. 
II. EARLY MARRIAGE IN THE MODERN UNITED STATES 
Despite the historical shift toward delayed marriage, 2010 U.S. census data 
reported 520,000 married or previously married adolescents aged fifteen to 
nineteen,165 and more than twenty-five percent of women and fifteen percent of 
men will marry before age twenty-three.166  Early marriers contravene the 
strong national trends toward delayed marriage and increased cohabitation.  
This Part surveys research that identifies characteristics of earlier marriers and 
the nature and outcomes of their marriages.  This research makes evident the 
high costs of early marriage, to both individuals and broader society. 
A. Demographics of Today’s Early Marriers 
A number of structural and cultural factors correlate with demographic 
differences in age at marriage.167  Having parents with low socioeconomic 
status and educational attainment predicts early marriage; nearly thirty percent 
of women without a college-educated parent marry early, as opposed to sixteen 
percent of women with a college-educated parent.168  The children of early 
marriers are also more likely to enter early marriages themselves.169  
Researchers have posited that these young people may be less likely to receive 
economic support from their parents, to attend college themselves, and to 
perceive attractive options outside of marriage.170  Researchers have found the 
highest concentration of early marriers among the relatively poorer and more 
religious residents of Southern and nonmetropolitan regions of the country.171 
In Red Families v. Blue Families, law and family scholars Naomi Cahn and 
June Carbone analyzed empirical research on families across the nation and 
found the highest rates of marriage overall and younger ages of entry into 
marriage in states whose citizens tend towards social conservatism and greater 
 
165 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 6. 
166 Uecker, supra note 20, at 38. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 30. 
169 Id. at 37. 
170 Id. at 18 (citing Diane K. McLaughlin et al., Some Women Marry Young: Transitions 
to First Marriage in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
827, 827-838 (1993)). 
171 McLaughlin et al., supra note 170, at 827.  Thirty-seven percent of women living in 
the rural South marry before age twenty-three.  Id. 
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religiosity.172  Level of religious commitment as well as one’s specific 
religious tradition both influence marriage timing.173  Judeo-Christian religious 
denominations in general support marriage and marital childbearing, while 
discouraging nonmarital sexuality.174  Denominations differ, however, in the 
emphasis they place on marriage and familism generally.  Conservative 
Protestants and Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) embrace a theology that views 
marriage as sacred and essential to spiritual salvation.175  Many evangelical 
denominations, in addition to adopting a strong pro-marriage orientation, 
actively discourage premarital sex and cohabitation.176  These denominations 
also embrace traditional gender roles, encouraging women to invest time and 
labor in their families within the context of marriage, deemphasizing or 
discouraging their labor force participation, and advocating deference to male 
authority within the home.177  When combined with strong pro-natalist 
orientations, these teachings incline young women towards marriage, 
childbearing, and domestic pursuits rather than education and workforce 
participation.178 
More than forty-two percent of women raised as conservative Protestants 
married early, closely followed by Mormon women.179  Along with committed 
adherents of other religious traditions, members of these religious groups 
marry earlier than mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and the religiously 
unaffiliated.180  Adolescents who attend school with higher proportions of 
 
172 NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL 
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 2-3, 118-19 (2010) (discussing the 
opposition of conservative and religious parents to making the morning-after pill available 
to those younger than eighteen, and concluding that “[r]ed families would accordingly like 
to reinforce parental control over wayward teens and make it harder to escape the 
consequences of improvident conduct”). 
173 Religious traditions place different types of emphasis on familism, which, according 
to some scholars, influences adherents’ marriage patterns.  Xiaohe Xu, Clark D. Hudspeth & 
John P. Bartkowski, The Timing of First Marriage: Are There Religious Variations?, 26 J. 
FAM. ISSUES 584 (2005) (exploring the correlation between religion and marriage timing and 
considering the role of familism – a cultural tendency to focus on the family more than the 
individual).  Conservative Protestants and Mormons are the most likely to marry early.  Id. 
at 588. 
174 Id. at 589; see also MARK D. REGNERUS, FORBIDDEN FRUIT: SEX & RELIGION IN THE 
LIVES OF AMERICAN TEENAGERS 21 (2007). 
175 MARK D. REGNERUS & JEREMY UECKER, PREMARITAL SEX IN AMERICA 176 (2011); 
Xu, Hudspeth & Bartkowski, supra note 173, at 590. 
176 Xu, Hudspeth & Bartkowski, supra note 173, at 590. 
177 Id. at 594. 
178 Id. 
179 Uecker, supra note 20, at 32. 
180 Id. at 609-10; Xu, Hudspeth & Bartkowski, supra note 173, at 607-08.  Although 
Catholicism has historically included a strong pro-marriage orientation, recent studies 
suggest that the Church’s influence over American Catholics’ decisions about sex, marriage, 
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religiously conservative peers, irrespective of their individual religious 
characteristics, are also more likely to marry early.181 
Early marriage also varies by race and sex.182  White and Latina women are 
the most likely to marry early, and nearly thirty percent marry before age 
twenty-three.183  Among men, Latinos marry early at the highest rates, with 
nearly twenty-five percent married before twenty-three, followed by White 
men at sixteen percent.184  African American women and men both were the 
least likely to marry early (almost certainly due to the lower marriage rates 
overall among African Americans), with eleven percent of women and nine 
percent of men marrying before twenty-three.185 
B. The Costs of Early Marriage 
Married individuals generally have greater financial, social, and 
psychological resources than the unmarried.186  They experience lower rates of 
chronic illness and physical limitation, and enjoy greater longevity.187  
Husbands tend to derive greater overall health benefits from marriage than do 
their wives, and at least some measure of the benefits that women derive stems 
from structural gender inequities.188  In other words, the health of married 
women “improves because they are married to health insurance: their lower-
paying jobs, and their inferior access to employment-based medical insurance, 
keep them away from the health care resources given more generously to 
working men.”189  Researchers have found some evidence of a selection effect, 
 
and procreation has waned.  Id. at 590 (citing studies). 
181 Uecker, supra note 20, at 81 tbl.3.4, 82. 
182 Id. at 32. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Matthew E. Dupre & Sarah O. Meadows, Disaggregating the Effects of Marital 
Trajectories on Health, 28 J. FAM. ISSUES 623, 625 (2007); Mary Rogers Gillmore et al., 
Marriage Following Adolescent Parenthood: Relationship to Adult Well-Being, 70 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1136, 1136 (2008) (gathering studies). 
187 LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED 
PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 47-52 (2000); Terrance J. 
Wade & David J. Pevalin, Marital Transitions and Mental Health, 45 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAV. 155 (2004); Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483 (1995). 
188 Bernstein, supra note 17, at 178-80; Kristi Williams, Has the Future of Marriage 
Arrived? A Contemporary Examination of Gender, Marriage, and Psychological Well-
Being, 44 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 470, 471 (2003); Kristi Williams & Debra Umberson, 
Marital Status, Marital Transitions, and Health: A Gendered Life Course Perspective, 45 J. 
HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 81, 83 (2004).  See generally Adrianne Frech & Kristi Williams, 
Depression and the Psychological Benefits of Entering Marriage, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAV. 149, 150 (2007). 
189 Bernstein, supra note 17, at 179-80; see also Janet Wilmoth & Gregor Koso, Does 
Marital History Matter? Marital Status and Wealth Outcomes Among Preretirement Adults, 
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suggesting that marriage alone cannot account for the greater well-being of 
married individuals; instead, individuals with greater well-being before 
marriage are more likely to attract marriage partners and sustain marriages.190 
A large and growing body of research identifies social costs associated with 
early marriage,191 while there is little evidence of offsetting benefits.192  For 
individuals to benefit from marriage, moreover, their marriages must remain 
intact.  Early marriages, however, are unlikely to do so.193  The following 
Sections examine the costs of early marriages. 
1. Family Instability and Divorce 
For decades, age at marriage has been the most consistent and unequivocal 
predictor of marital failure.194  In fact, “age at marriage is one of the strongest 
 
64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 254, 257 (2002). 
190 See, e.g., Arne Mastekaasa, Marriage and Psychological Well-Being: Some Evidence 
on Selection into Marriage, 54 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 901 (1992); Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. 
Frey, Does Marriage Make People Happy, or Do Happy People Get Married?, 35 J. SOCIO-
ECON. 326 (2006) (finding that part of the association between marriage and mental health is 
due to selection, as those with better mental health are also more likely to marry).  But cf. 
Kathleen A. Lamb, Gary R. Lee, & Alfred DeMaris, Union Formation and Depression: 
Selection and Relationship Effects, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 953 (2003) (finding no evidence 
of a selection effect with respect to depression, education, employment, income, or physical 
disability). 
191 See infra Parts II.B.1-4.  Research to date generally supports the conclusion that 
marrying “early can lead to added stress and disadvantage, and ultimately poor health, 
because important socioeconomic resources may be forfeited (e.g., education).”  Dupre & 
Meadows, supra note 186, at 626. 
192 See, e.g., SEILER, supra note 10, at 8 (stating, in an article published in 2002, that an 
analysis of the economic effects of marriage focusing “exclusively on teens is not 
available”).  One recent longitudinal study compared pregnant seventeen-year-olds who 
married at any point within the sixteen years following their pregnancies (most of those who 
married, however, did not marry the fathers of their babies – fewer than fourteen percent 
ever did) with others who never married, and the average age of those who married was 
twenty-three.  Gillmore et al., supra note 186, at 1140-42.  The study found that marriage 
conferred small but statistically significant benefits with respect to economic status and 
lower marijuana and polydrug use.  Id.  Marriage did not, however, improve the economic 
status of the very poor, nor did it affect psychological well-being, high school completion, 
or the use of other drugs or alcohol.  Id. 
193 See infra Part II.B.1. 
194 CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 172, at 55; THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 
8, at 19; Allan Booth & John N. Edwards, Age at Marriage and Marital Instability, 47 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 67, 68, 71 (1985); Heaton, supra note 8, at 407; Larson & Holman, 
supra note 8, at 230.  Historian Lawrence Stone noted that cultural trends throughout the 
Western world contributed to the rise of twentieth-century divorce rates.  He observed that 
“[a] significant decline in the age of marriage was also a factor in the 1960s, since teenage 
marriages were almost twice as likely to break up as those contracted at a later age.”  STONE, 
ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 403. 
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and most consistent predictors of marital stability ever found by social science 
research.”195  Marriages in general have mediocre chances of enduring – 
altogether, about half of all marriages will end in divorce.196  Early marriages, 
however, are significantly more likely to fail than are marriages entered later.  
Of marriages entered at age twenty-five or later, fewer than thirty percent end 
in divorce.197  Of marriages entered before age eighteen, on the other hand, 
nearly seventy percent end in divorce.198  The earliest marriers, those 
adolescents who enter marriage in their mid-teens, experience marital failure 
rates closer to a sobering eighty percent.199  Not until age twenty-two does 
marital stability improve significantly and do marriage dissolution rates begin 
to level off, although marriages entered at later ages are more stable still.200  
Delaying marriage by even a single year significantly reduces the odds of 
dissolution. 
A closer examination of the divorce rate over the last several decades 
reveals the significance of age at marriage on marital stability: The divorce rate 
increased through the 1970s until 1980, leveled off for a couple of years, and 
has since declined modestly.201  Over the same period, the median age at 
marriage steadily increased.202  If it had not, the divorce rate would have 
increased rather than decreased.203  In other words, “[a]ll of the decline in 
dissolution can be accounted for by the rising age at marriage.”204 
If divorce left family members more or less in the same position they would 
have been in had the couple never married, the high dissolution rate of early 
marriage might cause less consternation.  Mental health studies have shown, 
however, that the negative psychological effects of divorce are greater than the 
 
195 THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 8, at 19; Warren Clark & Susan 
Crompton, Till Death Do Us Part? The Risk of First and Second Marriage Dissolution, 11 
CAN. SOC. TRENDS 24, 25 (2006). 
196 National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, supra note 7; see also CHERLIN, THE 
MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND, supra note 7, at 2. 
197 Heaton, supra note 8, at 407. 
198 SEILER, supra note 10, at 7. 
199 Id.; Heaton, supra note 8, at 407. 
200 Heaton, supra note 8, at 407.  While age at marriage correlates with marital instability 
for both White and African American women, there is evidence that the correlation is 
stronger for White women.  For White women, marrying during adolescence results in a 
fifty-five percent higher risk of marital disruption than does marrying between the ages of 
twenty-three and twenty-nine; for African American women, the risk of disruption is forty 
percent higher than marrying between twenty-three and twenty-nine.  Megan M. Sweeney & 
Julie A. Phillips, Understanding Racial Differences in Marital Disruption: Recent Trends 
and Explanations, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 639, 644-45 (2004). 
201 Heaton, supra note 8, at 398. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 401. 
204 Id. 
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positive effects of entering marriage.205  For unwed mothers who marry then 
divorce, moreover, the risk of poverty is higher than it is for their counterparts 
who never marry.206 
2. Lost Educational Attainment and Future Poverty 
Teen marriage and lower educational attainment correlate.  Women who 
marry before age nineteen are fifty percent more likely to drop out of high 
school than are their unmarried counterparts, and four times less likely to 
complete college.207  And the correlation between educational attainment and 
income is so robust and unambiguous that it hardly bears repeating.208 
Teen mothers who married between conception and childbirth were less 
likely to ever return to school than teen mothers who did not marry.209  Teen 
mothers who marry are more likely to have a rapid second birth than are teen 
mothers who do not marry; they are also likely to have more children 
overall.210  Unsurprisingly, both closely-spaced births and having two or more 
children are associated with lower educational attainment.211 
Higher educational attainment, moreover, seems to have a protective effect 
against marital instability, and that protective effect has grown significantly in 
recent decades.  Among whites, having at least sixteen years of education 
(compared to having less than twelve years) reduced the odds of marital 
disruption by thirty-nine percent between 1990 and 1994, compared with an 
eight percent reduction between 1970 and 1979.212  The protective effect of 
higher education is even greater for African Americans, for whom having 
sixteen or more years of schooling was associated with a seventy-five percent 
reduction in the odds of disruption between 1990 and 1994, versus nineteen 
percent between 1970 and 1979.213 
 
205 Williams & Umberson, supra note 188, at 93-94; Zheng Wu & Randy Hart, The 
Effects of Nonmarital Union Transition on Health, 64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 420 (2002). 
206 SEILER, supra note 10, at 8. 
207 Dahl, supra note 13, at 691; Daniel Klepinger et al., How Does Adolescent Fertility 
Affect the Human Capital and Wages of Young Women, 34 J. HUM. RESOURCES 421, 443 
(1999).  See generally David C. Ribar, Teenage Fertility and High School Completion, 76 
REV.  ECON. & STAT. 413 (1994) (examining the impact of teen childbearing on high school 
completion rates). 
208 See, e.g., Lichter, Graefe & Brown, supra note 15, at 73. 
209 SEILER, supra note 10, at 8-9 (citing Steven D. McLaughlin et al., The Effects of the 
Sequencing of Marriage and First Birth During Adolescence, 18 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 12, 14 
tbls.1 & 2 (1986)). 
210 Id. at 8; Deborah Kalmuss & Pearila Brickner Namerow, Subsequent Childbearing 
Among Teenage Mothers: The Determinants of a Closely Spaced Second Birth, 26 FAM. 
PLAN. PERSP. 149, 151 (1994). 
211 Dianne Scott-Jones, Educational Levels of Adolescent Childbearers at First and 
Second Births, 99 AM. J. EDUC. 461, 468 tbl.2 (1991). 
212 Sweeney & Phillips, supra note 200, at 645. 
213 Id. 
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Early marriage also correlates with future poverty.  Researchers have only 
recently begun to study causality in the context of teen marriage.  Economist 
Gordon Dahl studied more than 140,000 early adolescent marriages (those 
involving women who were younger than sixteen when they married), finding 
that early marriages have had a strong negative effect on future poverty, and 
that this effect is not due to self-selection.214  Women who married young were 
significantly – thirty-one percentage points – more likely to live in poverty 
later in life than were women who delayed marriage.215  The negative effect of 
early marriage is stronger even than the sizable negative effect of failing to 
complete high school; women who dropped out of school were eleven 
percentage points more likely to be poor when older.216 
3. Effects on Women’s Mental and Physical Health 
In 2011, researchers published the results of the first national study of the 
effect of child marriage (before age eighteen) on adult mental health.217  The 
study found U.S. child marriages linked to a range of psychiatric disorders – 
indeed, “child marriage was significantly associated with all lifetime mental 
disorders except pathological gambling and histrionic and dependent 
personality disorders.”218  The most prevalent disorders were major depressive 
disorder, nicotine dependence, and specific phobias, but the researchers found 
the strongest association with antisocial personality disorder – the risk for 
women who married as children was nearly three times as high as that of adult 
marriers.219 
In another analysis of the association between relationship status and mental 
health of young adults, the group that reported the highest depressive 
symptoms comprised those who married at age eighteen or younger.220  The 
age group with the lowest levels of depressive symptoms comprised those who 
first married at age twenty-two or older.221 
 
214 Dahl, supra note 13, at 714. 
215 Id. at 691, 705-06. 
216 Id. at 705-06. 
217 Le Strat, Dubertet & Le Foll, supra note 5. 
218 Id. at 528. 
219 Id. at 527.  Other researchers have found maternal depression to be greater for women 
with younger age at first birth, falling to its lowest levels for women who first give birth 
around age thirty and correlating with later age of first marriage, higher educational 
attainment, and greater job security.  John Mirowsky & Catherine E. Ross, Depression, 
Parenthood, and Age at First Birth, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1281 (2002). 
220 Uecker, supra note 20, at 170-71, 170 tbl.5.2. 
221 Id. at 169-71.  Those who were engaged to be married reported levels of depressive 
symptoms comparable to those who first married at age twenty-two or older.  Id.  More 
young adults who have ever been married, however, report that they are very satisfied with 
their lives than do those who have never been married.  Nearly thirty-six percent of young 
adults in a dating relationship but never married report high overall life satisfaction, 
compared with nearly forty-eight percent of those who have ever been married.  Levels of 
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Researchers have also found adolescent marriage correlated with worsened 
physical health for women.222  Women who married at age eighteen or younger 
had a twenty-three percent greater risk of disease onset, including heart attack, 
diabetes, cancer, and stroke.223  The study’s authors found the negative impact 
of early marriage on women’s health unsurprising, “given that these females 
may forfeit important health resources and often face a greater likelihood of 
divorce.”224  The study found no evidence that early marriage worsened the 
physical health of men who married early.225 
Research uncovered no studies comparing the rates or types of intimate 
violence experienced by young married and unmarried women.  The U.S. 
Department of Justice has reported, however, that women aged sixteen to 
twenty-four experience the highest rates of violence at the hands of their 
intimate partners, including assaults, rape, robbery, and murder.226  This data 
raises concerns that when women in this age group marry, it becomes more 
difficult for them to exit violent relationships. 
4. Effects on Children’s Developmental Outcomes 
Numerous studies have compared the developmental outcomes of children 
born to young mothers and those born to adult mothers.227  Nearly half of all 
 
life satisfaction among married young adults vary significantly by age of marriage, 
however: of those first married at eighteen or younger, nearly forty-one percent report high 
life satisfaction, compared to more than fifty-five percent of those first married at age 
twenty-two or older.  Id. 
222 Dupre & Meadows, supra note 186. 
223 Id. at 636. 
224 Id.  Dupre and Meadows also posited that females marrying early may be more likely 
to have psychological disorders that predispose them to illness.  Id.  The Le Strat, Dubertet 
& Le Foll study sought to more precisely isolate the effect of child marriage on the 
development of mental disorders by including in their analyses only those psychiatric 
disorders with an age at onset later than the age at first marriage.  Le Strat, Dubertet & Le 
Foll, supra note 5, at 527. 
225 Dupre & Meadows, supra note 186, at 644. 
226 LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES: 
ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND 
GIRLFRIENDS 11 (1998), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vi.pdf. 
227 See, e.g., TERENCE P. THORNBERRY ET AL., GANGS AND DELINQUENCY IN 
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE (2003); Nan Marie Astone, Are Adolescent Mothers Just 
Single Mothers?, 3 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 353 (1993); Rebekah L. Coley & P. Lindsay 
Chase-Lansdale, Adolescent Pregnancy and Parenthood: Recent Evidence and Future 
Directions, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 152 (1998); Ariline T. Geronimus, Damned If You Do: 
Culture, Identity, Privilege, and Teenage Childbearing in the United States, 57 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 881 (2003); Greg Pogarsky et al., Developmental Outcomes for Children of Young 
Mothers, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 332 (2006); Greg Pogarsky, Alan J. Lizotte & Terence P. 
Thornberry, The Delinquency of Children Born to Young Mothers: Results from the 
Rochester Youth Development Study, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 101 (2003). 
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women who married before eighteen were also likely to be pregnant (forty-
eight percent, compared to three percent of women who married as adults).228  
Research has consistently shown that the children of mothers who begin 
childbearing at a young age have increased risks of various adverse outcomes.  
The elevated risks extend to children born later in the mother’s life,229 and 
include behavior problems and educational underachievement.230  The risk of 
adverse outcomes for the children of young mothers continues into adulthood, 
and includes a greater likelihood of poverty,231 unemployment,232 and 
becoming young parents themselves.233 
Researchers posit that factors tending to coexist alongside early parenthood 
contribute to adverse outcomes for children.234  For example, “women who 
initiate childbearing at young ages are more likely to experience disorder in the 
process of family formation, . . . [and] the stress associated with structural 
disadvantage and family disruption increases the likelihood of the mother’s 
own antisocial behavior, especially drug use.”235  Conversely, as Professors 
Cahn and Carbone have observed, older parents tend to bring greater resources 
– financial and emotional – to childrearing.  They point out that, in addition to 
generally being wealthier, “[p]arents in their late 20s are better educated, 
psychologically more mature, and more likely to interact with and stimulate 
young children than are younger parents.”236 
Studies of the developmental outcomes of children born to young mothers 
have not, however, isolated the mothers’ marital status.  It is thus possible that 
children of young married mothers fare better than those raised by unmarried 
young mothers.  An intact marital family may conceivably insulate children of 
young mothers from experiencing the effects of the various risk factors 
associated with early childbearing. 
At the same time, however, early marriers tend to endure many of the same 
life experiences associated with adverse outcomes for children: They are less 
likely to complete high school and attain the social and human capital needed 
 
228 Le Strat, Dubertet & Le Foll, supra note 5, at 526. 
229 Pogarsky et al., supra note 227, at 333. 
230 Coley & Chase-Lansdale, supra note 227, at 158; Lauren S. Wakschlag et al., 
Maternal Age at First Birth and Boys’ Risk for Conduct Disorder, 10 J. RES. ON 
ADOLESCENCE, 417, 432-33 (2000). 
231 Sara Jaffee et al., Why Are Children Born to Teen Mothers at Risk for Adverse 
Outcomes in Young Adulthood? Results from a 20-year Longitudinal Study, 13 DEV. & 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 377, 391 (2001). 
232 Id. at 389. 
233 J.B. Hardy et al., Like Mother, Like Child: Intergenerational Patterns of Age at First 
Birth and Associations with Childhood and Adolescent Characteristics and Adult Outcomes 
in the Second Generation, 34 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1220, 1229 (1998). 
234 Pogarsky et al., supra note 227, at 333. 
235 Id. 
236 CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 172, at 55 (citations omitted). 
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for financial security, they experience higher levels of family dissolution, and 
they tend to exhibit ineffective parenting styles.  All of these factors – reduced 
parental educational attainment,237 economic disadvantage,238 family 
disruption (including changes in parent figures and caregivers),239 and poor 
parenting styles240 – likely increase the risk of negative outcomes for children 
of young mothers, married and unmarried alike. 
III. REGULATORY LAG: THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF MODERN ADOLESCENCE 
AND MODERN MARRIAGE 
That the median age at first marriage is higher now than at any other time in 
the nation’s history reflects ongoing adaptation to changing social contexts.  
Some young people nonetheless want to marry, will obtain (if they are under 
the age of presumptive consent) their parents’ or judicial consent, and will 
marry with predictably poor results. 
The empirical evidence of the costs of early marriages alone should prompt 
rethinking of current policy extending them civil and legal recognition.  Yet 
the law recognizes adolescents’ decisionmaking competence in other arguably 
analogous contexts, such as abortion.241  Denying young individuals the ability 
to marry based solely on the empirical evidence is arguably justified; it would 
fail, however, to provide a principled justification for the different treatment of 
young people in the marital than in analogous decisionmaking contexts. 
This Part argues that marital capacity is different: sustaining the modern 
marriage requires not only the decisional capacity required for valid legal 
consent, but also a variety of psychosocial and other adult-level capacities that 
young people will not have reliably acquired until their early twenties.  Thus, a 
principled distinction does exist between adolescents’ marital capacity and 
other decisionmaking capacities.  This Part argues that adolescents and 
emerging adults lack the former, even while they may possess the latter. 
A. Reconceptualizing Marital Capacity 
Marriage law has essentially adopted from the law of contract the concept of 
legal consent.  For a valid contract, an individual must have the capacity to 
understand the nature of an agreement and to enter it willingly.  That the 
individual is unlikely to successfully perform the contract will not invalidate it. 
 
237 THORNBERRY ET AL., supra note 227, at 65. 
238 Id. 
239 Astone, supra note 227; Rand D. Conger et al., A Family Process Model of Economic 
Hardship and Adjustment of Early Adolescent Boys, 63 CHILD DEV. 526, 537 (1992). 
240 Rolf Loeber & Maga Stouthamer-Loeber, Family Factors as Correlates and 
Predictors of Juvenile Conduct Problems and Delinquency, 7 CRIME & JUST. 29 (1986). 
241 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (extending to minors the right to 
terminate a pregnancy but upholding parental consent laws with the provision that a judicial 
bypass procedure be available). 
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This Part argues that, in light of the evidence of the previous Parts, and in 
light of what is known about adolescent cognitive development (relevant 
aspects of which are summarized below), adolescents and emerging adults 
have the cognitive capacity to give what currently amounts to legally valid 
consent to marriage, but they lack the psychosocial capacity to “perform” the 
contract.  This Part further argues that both of these are required for “marital 
capacity,” and thus both ought to be required for a valid marriage. 
1. Capacity to Consent 
Freely given consent has long been the sine qua non of a valid marriage.242  
U.S. marriage law derives from contract law three basic requirements for valid 
consent: legal capacity, mental or cognitive competence, and voluntariness 
(absence of duress or undue influence).243 
Legal capacity refers to the presumptive ability to enter binding contracts at 
all.  The law variously withholds from certain categories of individuals the 
power to enter contracts, or it refuses to enforce against categories of 
individuals agreements they have made.244  Categorical capacity/incapacity 
reflects a determination that an identifiable group of individuals predictably 
lacks some characteristic necessary to perform an act of legal consequence.  
Enslaved people, married women, minors, and the mentally ill have all been 
denied legal capacity at some point in the history of the United States.245  Into 
the nineteenth century, for example, women lost their separate legal identities 
upon marrying, as well as the capacity to take legal action in their own names 
absent their husbands’ concurrence.246 
The requirement of legal capacity today operates to exclude fewer 
categories of individuals than it once did, instead more narrowly aiming to 
identify those whose members lack a minimum level of cognitive and 
decisionmaking competence.  Minors and the mentally ill continue to 
presumptively lack legal capacity; the members of both groups are deemed to 
 
242 To consent is “[v]oluntarily to accede to or acquiesce in what another proposes or 
desires; to agree, comply, yield.”  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford University Press 
ed., 2d ed. 1989). 
243 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12-16 (1981); id. § 12 cmt. a (defining 
capacity as “the legal power which a normal person would have under the same 
circumstances,” thus contemplating both legal capacity and mental competency). 
244 Id. § 12. 
245 Id. § 12 cmt. b.  Contract law distinguishes incompetence due to pathological mental 
illness from age-related immaturity.  Thus in discussing the “wide variety of types” of 
mental incompetency, the Restatement (Second) includes “congenital deficiencies in 
intelligence, the mental deterioration of old age, the effects of brain damage caused by 
accident or organic disease, and mental illnesses evidenced by such symptoms as delusions, 
hallucinations, delirium, confusion and depression.”  Id. § 15 cmt. b. 
246 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442-43.  A wife’s legal personhood was 
“incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.”  Id. at *430. 
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possess insufficient judgment and understanding to enter an agreement to 
which they should be held.247 
The other requirements for legally valid consent – mental/cognitive 
competence and voluntariness – protect otherwise-capable individuals from the 
effects of agreements entered under conditions that in some way deprived them 
of capacity to consent.  An otherwise mentally competent individual, for 
example, might escape a contract entered during a period of temporary 
incapacity, such as intoxication.  Avoiding a contract by demonstrating 
incompetence is difficult, however, as the competence required for a legally 
enforceable contract is relatively minimal.  The competence required to 
contract marriage, for example, requires simply that individuals “understand 
the rights, duties, and responsibilities of marriage at the time of the marriage 
contract.”248 
Lastly, valid consent requires voluntariness – that is, consent given absent 
duress or undue influence.  “Duress” induces a person to manifest assent to a 
contract as a result of a threat that leaves no reasonable alternative.249  “Undue 
influence” results in a person’s manifesting assent to a contract because of the 
use of unfair persuasion by someone in position to dominate the person, or in a 
position of trust.250  The lines between influence, persuasion, and coercion are 
not sharply defined, of course, and decisions always occur within a specific 
social context.  Community norms and expectations shape preferences and can 
influence resulting decisions.251  Individuals also may be influenced by more 
direct persuasion.  To require voluntariness is not to require that individuals do 
not make decisions within analytical vacuums; instead, it aims to ensure a 
minimum level of independent thought and volitional behavior. 
Legally valid consent thus requires cognitive and decisionmaking 
competence – an individual must have legal capacity (itself a proxy for 
 
247 Minors gain legal capacity once they reach the age of majority, and upon gaining or 
regaining capacity, both minors and the mentally ill may elect to either ratify or disaffirm an 
agreement entered during their period of incapacity.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 12; see also Hunt v. Hunt, 412 S.W.2d 7, 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965) (holding 
that a person who lacks mental competence at the time marriage was entered may 
nonetheless ratify the decision to marry upon regaining competence and by doing so 
validate the marriage); Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 547, 560 (2000). 
248 Nave v. Nave, 173 S.W.3d 766, 774 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 
249 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-177. 
250 Id. § 176.  As is the case with nonage, however, a person who enters a marriage under 
duress or as a result of undue influence may choose later to either invalidate or ratify the 
marriage contract.  Id.  General contract law provides that if the other party to the 
transaction induced the assent, the contract is voidable, but if a third party induced the 
assent without the knowledge of the other party to the transaction, who has in good faith 
relied on the contract, the contract is valid.  Id.  Courts deciding the validity of marriages 
allegedly entered under duress or undue influence have not applied this exception, however. 
251 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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presumptively adequate cognitive and decisionmaking abilities), must be 
competent to understand the nature of marriage and the marital obligation, and 
must undertake it voluntarily.252 
 
2. Capacity to Sustain 
It is one thing to make a marital commitment; it is another to keep it.  Some 
functional aspects of marriage and marital family life have remained largely 
unchanged over time – couples generally share a household, bear and raise 
children, and assume obligations of financial support.  Other aspects of married 
life have changed drastically.  This Article argues that a historic confluence of 
economic and cultural developments has fundamentally altered modern 
marriages and also the capacities required for them to flourish.  These 
developments have rendered marriage more difficult to sustain than at any time 
in history. 
First, economic changes have significantly altered the means by which 
married couples are most likely to support their families and achieve financial 
security.  The disappearance of home and agricultural production, then of the 
family wage, have pushed both members of marital couples into the paid 
workforce.  And now virtually all non-menial jobs require “credentials” of 
some sort – increasingly, a college degree.253  Young people with a high school 
education or less are likely to experience “several years of career instability 
characterized by periods of unemployment and a series of dead-end, minimum-
wage jobs.”254  The financial instability linked to low educational attainment 
decreases the ability to comfortably support a family and increases marital 
stress and the likelihood of marital dissolution.255 
Second, cultural understandings of and expectations for marriage have 
changed significantly.  Today’s normative marriage is a union of soulmates 
who share intimacy and romantic love, and who foster each other’s personal 
growth and fulfillment.  As the division of labor within marriages has become 
less gendered, moreover, so too has the marital relationship itself; it is no 
longer a presumptive hierarchy in which wives submit to their husbands’ 
authority.  Instead, marriage has become a more complex partnership of 
equals, who now must negotiate market and household work and childrearing 
in an egalitarian manner.256 
 
252 Part III.B examines the age-related attainment of the capacity to consent. 
253 Marilyn J. Montgomery & James E. Cote, College as a Transition to Adulthood, in 
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE 149, 156 (Gerald R. Adams & Michael D. 
Berzonsky eds., 2003).  On average, an individual with a bachelor’s degree has between 
twenty and forty percent higher earnings than a high school graduate.  Id. 
254 Fred W. Vondracek & Erik J. Porfeli, The World of Work and Careers, in 
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE, supra note 253, at 109, 120. 
255 See supra notes 116, 212-13 and accompanying text. 
256 One study comparing the reasons given by couples for their divorces between 1949 
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Researchers have sought to increase the likelihood of couples successfully 
meeting the relational challenges of the modern marriage.  They have observed 
that modern marriage requires partners to “continually negotiate the bargain 
and invest in the joint enterprise on an intimate, interpersonal level.” 257  It calls 
for ongoing, open, and mature communication – and significant effort.  The 
relational demands of the modern marriage are different in nature and exceed 
in scope the demands of the institutionalized and companionate marriages of 
the past, and they “call[] for a level of personal responsibility and skill that 
perhaps only a small minority of men and women achieved in the past.”258 
Scholars who study psychology and culture have described key 
psychological characteristics of individuals who are much more likely than 
others to have attained the mature levels of commitment and the 
communication, negotiation, and interpersonal skills that underpin the marital 
relationship: 
[They] are secure in their unique identities as individuals beyond societal 
roles, including gender roles.  [Individuals possessing secure personal 
identities are better able to] interact in productive work and love 
relationships[,] . . . exhibit greater capacity for both autonomy from and 
intimacy with others[,] and are able to commit themselves to projects and 
people.259 
Attaining a distinct and secure personal identity and developing 
sophisticated relational skills go hand in hand.  Individuals who “develop 
personal identities and a sense of self-worth before they enter marriages . . . 
[will more readily develop] greater awareness of self and other [sic] as 
individuals and greater skill in personal communication” 260 – skills that equip 
them to negotiate the demands of the modern marriage, enhance relational 
quality, and ultimately improve their chances of enjoying long-term marital 
success.
 
 
B. The Age-Related Attainment of Marital Capacity 
The following Sections draw on research in the developmental sciences to 
identify the age or age range by which individuals will have reliably attained 
 
and 1996 in the Netherlands found that “[t]he reasons for divorce appear to have shifted 
from behavioral problems to relational problems.”  Paul M. de Graaf & Matthijs Kalmijn, 
Divorce Motives in a Period of Rising Divorce: Evidence from a Dutch Life-History Survey, 
27 J. FAM. ISSUES 483, 503 (2006).  Couples have thus become less likely to cite behaviors 
such as violence or infidelity as causes for their divorce, and more likely to cite 
dissatisfaction with their relationships – growing apart, receiving insufficient attention, 
inability to talk to one another, etc.  Women also increasingly cite dissatisfaction with the 
division of household labor.  Id. 
257 Vannoy, supra note 115, at 259. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 252. 
260 Id. at 263. 
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each aspect of marital capacity – the cognitive and decisionmaking capacities 
required to voluntarily consent to marriage, and the relational capacities 
required to sustain it. 
1. Cognitive Maturity in Adolescence and Capacity to Consent 
This Section aims to identify the age or age range by which young people 
have the capacity to “understand the rights, duties, and responsibilities of 
marriage”261 and in light of that understanding, determine also whether they 
are able to make a voluntary choice to enter marriage. 
Cognitive capacity, including learning and reasoning from facts and 
information processing, improves more or less linearly throughout childhood, 
reaching adult-like levels by mid-adolescence.262  Researchers have 
consistently found “the logical reasoning and basic information-processing 
abilities of 16-year-olds” to be “comparable to . . . [or] essentially 
indistinguishable” from those of adults.263  By mid-adolescence, thinking 
processes are adult-like.  According to developmental psychologist David 
Moshman, “[n]o theorist or researcher has ever identified a form or level of 
thinking routine among adults that is rarely seen in adolescents.”264 
By ages fifteen or sixteen, adolescents have attained adult-like cognitive-
processing capacities.  In other words, they are as able as are adults to acquire, 
retain, and retrieve relevant information and apply to that information 
reasoning processes that lead to justifiable conclusions.  They thus can 
understand the nature of marriage and its requirements, and they have the 
ability to make a rational decision whether to marry or not. 
One might argue, however, that assent to marriage in spite of the slim 
chances of relationship success itself renders the typical young person’s 
consent to marriage irrational and therefore evidence of cognitive 
incompetence.  That argument fails, however.  Although it is arguably true that 
the adolescent’s or emerging adult’s decision to marry must be irrational (in 
light of its near-inevitable failure), the decisional defect exhibited by 
adolescents here does not differ significantly from the same defect 
demonstrated by adults on the verge of marrying.  Studies have shown, for 
 
261 Nave v. Nave, 173 S.W.3d 766, 774 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added). 
262 Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’ 
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 583, 590-92 (2009).  In previous work, I have summarized in some detail research 
in developmental neuroscience and psychology that has begun to explain the development 
of adolescents’ decisionmaking capacities.  See Vivian E. Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, 
Cognitive Development, and the Age of Electoral Majority, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1449, 1507-
13 (2012); Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055, 
1110-16. 
263 Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 
28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78, 80 (2008). 
264 DAVID MOSHMAN, ADOLESCENT RATIONALITY AND DEVELOPMENT 26 (3d ed. 2011). 
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example, that even when they know the statistical likelihood of marital failure 
to be around 50%, adults estimated the likelihood of their marriages 
succeeding to approach 100%.265  Given that the belief in the exceptionalism of 
one’s impending union is characteristic of adults, the presence of the same 
characteristic in adolescent marital decisionmaking is insufficient to justify 
recharacterizing their consent as irrational or incompetent.  To do so would 
subject adolescents to a higher standard of rationality in decisionmaking than 
that to which the state currently holds adults. 
Adolescents’ decisionmaking capacities are more susceptible than are 
adults’, however, to being confounded by the real-world contexts in which they 
make decisions.266  Studies found that contexts that predictably compromise 
adolescent decisionmaking include those requiring them to make decisions “in 
the heat of passion, in the presence of peers, on the spur of the moment, in 
unfamiliar situations, . . . [and] when behavioral inhibition is required for good 
outcomes.”267  In other words, adolescents tend to make bad decisions in 
emotionally charged or pressured situations, and they struggle to control 
impulses that lead to undesirable behavior.268  Thus when they must make 
 
265 See JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT & JOSEPH SCHWAB, THE CLARK UNIVERSITY POLL OF 
EMERGING ADULTS 16 (2012). 
266 Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk 
Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental 
Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 625 (2005); Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Is 
the Teen Brain Too Rational?, 17 SCI. AM. MIND 58, 60 (2007) [hereinafter Reyna & Farley, 
Teen Brain].  Cognitive researchers have referred to this as the “competence-performance 
distinction.”  Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Studying 
Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 220 (1996).  
Consistent with these observations, studies demonstrate that not all cognitive processes 
mature by mid-adolescence.  Some processes, such as certain aspects of working memory, 
continue to specialize and develop into adulthood.  Beatriz Luna et al., Maturation of 
Cognitive Processes from Late Childhood to Adulthood, 75 CHILD DEV. 1357, 1367-68 
(suggesting that all components of working memory mature by approximately age nineteen).  
Working memory is involved in the voluntary control of behavior (including the ability to 
filter irrelevant information and suppress inappropriate actions) and other complex mental 
abilities.  Id. 
267 Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision 
Making, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1, 1 (2006) [hereinafter Reyna & Farley, Risk and 
Rationality]; see also Eric Amsel et al., Anticipating and Avoiding Regret as a Model of 
Adolescent Decision-Making, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING IN 
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 119, 120 (Janis E. Jacobs & Paul A. Klaczynski eds., 2005). 
268 Reyna & Farley, Teen Brain, supra note 266, at 60; Reyna & Farley, Risk and 
Rationality, supra note 267, at 1.  Even though they do not generally misperceive risks (if 
anything, studies have tended to show that adolescents and adults both overestimate risk), 
adolescents tend to weigh and value benefits more heavily than risks, as compared to adults.  
Researchers advance a number of theories, some related to cognition and some grounded in 
neural development itself, to explain this.  Baruch Fischhoff, Assessing Adolescent 
Decision-Making Competence, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 12, 19-20 (2008); see also Beatriz 
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decisions quickly or under time pressure, when they are highly emotional or 
stressed, when they are in unfamiliar situations, or when they are subjected to 
external or peer pressure, adolescents’ decisionmaking suffers. 
Some adolescents will consider whether to marry under unpressured, 
considered circumstances, but many will not.  An individual’s manifestation of 
assent is invalid if given involuntarily.269  Adolescents may be pressured to 
marry by their older adult partners, parents, or other authority figures (such as 
religious leaders).  Couples faced with unintentional pregnancy may be 
pressured to marry by parents or partners. 
Even though some adolescents will consider marriage under stressful 
situations, it is a decisionmaking context that differs, for example, from 
impulsive and peer-influenced decisions to commit a crime, or even engage in 
sexual activity itself.270  Instead, entering marriage is generally the sort of 
considered decision that researchers have found adolescents capable of making 
even under less-than-ideal conditions.  Researchers analyzing the 
decisionmaking processes of adolescent girls confronted with unintended 
pregnancies, for example, found that those aged “14 to 17 appear to be similar 
to legal adults in both cognitive competence and volition.”271  Researchers also 
found that these adolescents “remain competent decision makers when facing 
an emotionally challenging real world decision.”272 
Research thus suggests that adolescents, by ages fifteen or sixteen, have the 
presumptive capacity to consent to marry.  There are undoubtedly cases where 
duress or undue influence will have rendered their consent involuntary.  That 
circumstances exist in individual cases that would legally vitiate or invalidate 
expressed consent does not, however, extinguish adolescents’ presumptive 
capacity to give what qualifies as legally valid consent. 
2. Psychosocial Development, the Prolonged Life Course to Adulthood, 
and Incapacity to Sustain Modern Marriage 
The previous Section argued that adolescents have the cognitive capacity to 
consent to marriage.  This Section argues that they lack other capacities 
 
Luna, Developmental Changes in Cognitive Control Through Adolescence, in 37 ADVANCES 
IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 233, 237-38 (Patricia Bauer ed., 2009) [hereinafter 
Luna, Developmental Changes]. 
269 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-177 (1981). 
270 See Jennifer Ann Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science, Teenagers, 
and the Sting to “The Age of Consent,” 20 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 113-15 (2012) (proposing that a 
minor’s consent to sex with an adult should be legally binding unless the minor voids assent 
during minority).  At least two-thirds of U.S. adolescents have had sex by twelfth grade.  
Lisa J. Crockett, et al., Adolescent Sexuality: Behavior and Meaning, in BLACKWELL 
HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE, supra note 253, at 371, 373.   
271 Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ 
Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129, 
148 (1992). 
272 Id. 
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required to sustain the modern marriage.  In light of the empirical evidence of 
the instability and costs of early marriage, the appropriate inquiry in this 
Section might not be whether adolescents and emerging adults are capable of 
sustaining marriage, but instead why it is that they are not.  This Section argues 
that the answer lies in the same historic confluence of cultural and structural 
factors that have made marriage more difficult for all couples to sustain, but is 
compounded for young people by developmental factors that shape the social 
and individual context in which they enter and endeavor to sustain marriage. 
For individuals who marry before age twenty-two, the odds of sustaining 
marriage are significantly worse than they are for those who delay marriage to 
age twenty-two.  Delaying marriage even further continues to increase marital 
stability, but the gains of delay lessen thereafter.273  Neither attaining age 
eighteen, the near-universal age of majority and of presumptive marital 
capacity, nor obtaining the consent of parents and/or judges (a requirement 
universally imposed on those individuals seeking to marry prior to reaching 
eighteen) have an observable effect on marital stability.  Only delay, along 
with a number of factors integrally associated with it, reliably increases marital 
stability. 
Why are marriages entered before the early twenties so much less stable 
than those entered later?  First, developmental scientists have amassed 
evidence that individuals do not reach psychosocial maturity until their early 
twenties.  Psychologist Jeffrey Arnett has identified the period from age 
eighteen to twenty-five as what is now widely acknowledged to be a distinct 
developmental period in the modern life course, and which he has termed 
“emerging adulthood.”274  
Developmental neuroscientists have begun to explain the neurological bases 
for the coexistence of adolescent cognitive maturity and socio-emotional 
immaturity.  They have begun developing a neurologically based model 
primarily oriented around the development in two neural systems of the brain: 
that associated with cognitive control, and that associated with socio-emotional 
maturity.  The core insight of this dual-systems model is that these two neural 
systems develop along different timelines.275  This temporal disjunction has the 
potential to explain adolescents’ impulsivity and poor decisionmaking in some 
contexts despite their improved cognitive ability, as well as other aspects of 
adolescent psychology and behavior.276  
 
273 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
274 JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, ADOLESCENCE AND EMERGING ADULTHOOD: A CULTURAL 
APPROACH 14 (2001). 
275 Steinberg, supra note 263, at 97–98; see also Laurence Steinberg et al., Age 
Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: 
Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764 (2008) 
(finding that “[n]eurobiological evidence in support of the dual systems model is rapidly 
accumulating”). 
276 See infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.  For slightly different accounts of the 
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As discussed above, adolescents’ basic cognitive abilities are mature by age 
sixteen, giving them the capacity to process information and make rational 
decisions.  But a heightened sensitivity to rewards that increases and peaks 
around mid-adolescence inclines them towards risk taking, sensation seeking, 
and impulsivity.  These inclinations may dominate or overwhelm their 
cognitive processes and shape their behaviors, especially in situations 
triggering heightened emotion or pressure.277  Adolescents’ susceptibility to 
the confounding influence of heightened reward salience on their 
decisionmaking begins to decline after mid-adolescence, however, while their 
abilities to exercise cognitive control increase, ultimately reaching mature 
levels in their twenties.278 
Most adolescents and emerging adults actively engage in a period of identity 
exploration most evident in the contexts of work, worldviews, and intimate 
relationships.279  First theorized by Erik Erikson, identity formation is a 
gradual process that occurs most intensely during adolescence.280  During this 
period, individuals’ beliefs, commitments and relationships tend to be in flux 
as they “actively explor[e] possibilities for self-definition, which may require 
questioning or rejecting previously held beliefs.”281  In the late 1960s, Erikson 
observed that the period of identity formation was prolonged in industrialized 
societies, and psychologists now believe that most identity development 
continues through late adolescence and into the twenties.282  Following a 
period of exploration, individuals ideally reach identity achievement, a more 
stable (though not unchanging) identity status whereby they commit to 
 
dual-systems model, see B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 
62, 63 (2008), Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and 
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Catherine Sebastian et al., Social Brain Development and the Affective Consequences of 
Ostracism in Adolescence, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 134, 138 (2010) (discussing aspects of 
the dual-systems model). 
277 Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 268, at 257; Steinberg, supra note 263, at 
97–98.  Researchers have more generally found the following personality traits and 
contextual factors correlated with suboptimal choices: sensation seeking, impulsivity, 
competitiveness, overconfidence, and the presence of peers.  James P. Byrnes, Cognitive 
Development During Adolescence, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE, supra note 
253, at 227, 236. 
278 Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 268, at 257; Steinberg, supra note 263, at 
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280 Elizabeth S. Scott, Keynote Address: Adolescence and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 
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see also James E. Marcia, Identity in Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT 
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personal, occupational, and ideological choices.283  Some studies have found 
that both females and emerging adults who do not attend college progress 
towards identity achievement somewhat faster than others.284  Even for non-
college adolescents and emerging adults and for females, however, the 
majority have not reached identity achievement by age twenty-one, and 
researchers have only recently begun conducting studies of identity 
achievement beyond this age.285 
This research has significant implications for adolescents’ and emerging 
adults’ capacity to sustain marriage.  Modern marriage demands relationship 
skills and requires levels of emotional maturity that were not required to 
sustain the marriages of the past.  Indeed, the changed meaning and function of 
marriage requires a level of maturity that young people will not achieve until 
their early twenties.  Individuals’ development before marriage of personal 
identities and relational skills, which comes only with time and life experience, 
promises to improve the likelihood of marriages’ success and endurance.286 
Finally, adolescents will not have attained the postsecondary education or 
work experience increasingly required to obtain well-paying work in an 
information- and technology-based post-industrial economy.287  Low-paying 
work and occupational instability hinders the ability to support a family, and 
financial insecurity stresses the marital relationship.  Indeed, the higher levels 
of education required in order to obtain entry into better-paying work has 
contributed to young people’s postponing marriage and childbearing.288 
Research on adolescent development thus suggests that, in light of ongoing 
psychological and brain development, as well as the relatively prolonged life 
course to adulthood in the postindustrial society, young individuals do not 
attain marital capacity until their early twenties.  The empirical evidence of the 
instability of marriages entered earlier supports this conclusion.  The rising age 
of marriage, falling rates of adolescent childbearing, and growing investment 
in education all reflect appropriate adaptation to the modern cultural and 
economic context.  The law, however, has yet to similarly adapt. 
C. Correcting Regulatory Lag: Raising the Age of Presumptive Marital 
Capacity 
Through a single statutory adjustment – raising the age at which individuals 
may marry – legislators could reduce the percentage of marriages ending in 
 
283 James E. Marcia, The Empirical Study of Ego Identity, in IDENTITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 67, 75 (H.A. Bosma et al. eds., 1994). 
284 See Gordon Munro & Gerald R. Adams, Ego-Identity Formation in College Students 
and Working Youth, 13 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 523 (1977). 
285 ARNETT, supra note 274, at 175; JANE KROGER, IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT: 
ADOLESCENCE THROUGH ADULTHOOD 4 (2000). 
286 Vannoy, supra note 115, at 263. 
287 Arnett, supra note 116, at 478; Vondracek & Porfeli, supra note 254, at 120. 
288 Arnett, supra note 116, at 478. 
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divorce, improve women’s mental and physical health, and elevate women’s 
and children’s socioeconomic status. 
1. Policy Considerations 
Public support of marriage is costly.  State and federal government subsidize 
marital families, which receive billions of dollars annually in direct and 
indirect benefits.289  Divorce, too, is costly.  Particularly for mothers who have 
forgone education and work experience within marriages, post-divorce life is 
more difficult than never-married life.  At least some will turn to the state for 
public assistance to help support their families. 
There is a growing body of evidence that young people do not achieve 
marital capacity until their early twenties.  And there is overwhelming 
empirical evidence that early marriage ultimately harms the individuals who 
marry (women in particular), provides little if any benefit to children, and 
imposes significant costs on society. 
To avoid the worst of these social costs, states should consider raising the 
presumptive age of marital capacity to twenty-one or twenty-two.  Empirical 
evidence suggests that delaying marriage to twenty-two would result in the 
most effective increase in stability.  While stability continues to improve every 
year after age twenty-two, it does so at a much slower rate.  At the same time, 
a number of age-related rights already accrue at twenty-one.290  Given its 
current existence as a marker of maturity, then, there may be less political 
resistance to having the right to marry also accrue at twenty-one. 
States would do well to remove altogether statutory exceptions allowing 
adolescents younger than eighteen to marry.  Again, however, given that age 
eighteen is currently the age of legal majority in most states and thus a marker 
of adult entitlement, there may be less public resistance to a policy change that 
retained eighteen as the minimum marital age, but that required young people 
between eighteen and twenty-one to obtain judicial (not parental) approval 
before obtaining a marriage license.  Parental approval has provided little or no 
safeguard against the instability of early marriages.  Statutes might thus impose 
clearer (and higher) standards for judicial approval. 
2. Constitutional Considerations 
For young people wanting to marry, state regulations denying them that 
ability constrain their liberty.  After the Supreme Court explicitly declared 
marriage to be a fundamental right,291 young couples challenged the age-based 
regulations imposed by several states as unconstitutional infringements on their 
right to marry.  None of these challenges succeeded, however, and the courts 
have universally found marital age restrictions to be constitutionally 
 
289 Bernstein, supra note 17, at 177. 
290 Every state has set age twenty-one as the legal drinking age, for example. 
291 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
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acceptable.292  Age restrictions, courts have reasoned, do not deny couples the 
right to marry but instead merely delay their entry into marriage and thus do 
not constitute the sort of substantial interference with the fundamental right to 
marry that the Supreme Court has held impermissible.293 
States remain free to extend greater liberties than those minimally required 
by the Constitution, and as discussed above, many states have done so.  The 
statutes that allow adolescents to marry, however, are not constitutionally 
compelled. 
The right to direct the upbringing and education of one’s children has also 
been deemed fundamental.294  Parents retain this right until their children reach 
the age of majority, although the state’s role as parens patriae justifies 
widespread measures (for example, compulsory education requirements) aimed 
at ensuring the well-being of minors.  Provisions requiring minors to obtain 
parental consent prior to marrying thus reflect respect for deference to parental 
authority; but they also delegate to parents the task of ensuring the adequate 
maturity of those minors wishing to marry.  As this Article has argued, the 
empirical evidence makes clear that this delegation is – at best – an 
unsuccessful one. 
CONCLUSION 
In the preindustrial economy, marriage served pragmatic ends – ensuring 
economic survival through combined spousal effort, ideally aided by the labor 
of children.  Expectations of the marital relationship were similarly pragmatic.  
The structural and cultural changes of postindustrial society have forced 
fundamental change on the institution of marriage: economic security 
increasingly requires extended formal education; increased gender equality and 
the availability of market work has eliminated the inevitability of women’s 
economic dependence on marriage; divorce makes available a relatively 
destigmatized exit from unsuccessful unions; and cultural changes have raised 
the expectations of marital relationship, rendering it an intense intimate 
relationship, and substantially more difficult to sustain than in the past. 
The steady rise in the median age at first marriage to what are now historic 
highs for both men and women evinces popular acknowledgement of, and 
adaptation to, the new social context of marriage.  The continued existence of 
too-early marriages, however, unnecessarily imposes significant costs – on 
early marriers, their children, and society.  The state does well to respect 
individuals’ life choices, even when improvident.  When those choices impose 
sufficiently high costs on others, however, the state and its legal institutions 
abrogate their proper roles by failing to respond appropriately.  The high costs 
imposed by early marriage require a legal response through which the law, too, 
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adapts to the new social context within which its members enter and endeavor 
to sustain marriage. 
 
